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CASE NOTES
Assignments -

Priority of a Subsequent Judgment Creditor Over an

Equitable Assignee. -In January appellant-bank made a loan to Bedford Bar
& Grill, and took as security an assignment of any refund that might become
due to the latter should either the state liquor license for which Bedford was
applying be denied or, if granted, be subsequently cancelled. The license was
granted. In June the bank called Bedford's note because of defaults in payment and filed its assignment with the State Comptroller. The license was
surrendered for cancellation by Bedford on July 8. New York City docketed
a warrant for taxes due the city on August 13. The city obtained a judgment
creditor's lien on the refund due Bedford on September 24. The New York
Supreme Court, Special Term, directed the State Comptroller to pay the
refund money to the city. The appellate division affirmed. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, held, two judges dissenting, affirmed. As between the
equitable lien of an assignee and a subsequent judgment creditor's lien, the
judgment creditor's lien takes priority. City of New York v. Bedford Bar &
Grill, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 429, 141 N.E.2d 575 (1957).

An assignment is a manifestation of intention by the owner of a right,
presently to transfer the right to the assignee. 1 Where the assignment is effec'tive, the assignee is put in the same position as the assignor, with respect to the
rights formerly held by the assignor. 2 At early common law choses in action
were not assignable. 3 However, courts of equity, acting upon the principle that
a ... a man may bind himself to do anything not impossible, and that he ought
to perform his obligations when not illegal . . ." have always enforced, at least

between the parties, assignments of choses in action, expectancies, possibilities,
and the like when made for valuable consideration. 4 As the common law
developed, choses in action became assignable at law and a legal right was
recognized in the assignee where the assignor formerly had one.5 This was true
even though the assignor's right at the time of the assignment was a conditional right or subject to future contingencies Though the transfer of such a
conditional right is effective immediately,7 the right is unenforceable by the
assignee until the condition occurs.8
In the present case, until the license was granted or refused, the appellantbank was the legal assignee of an existing conditional right0 to a refund of
1.

Restatement, Contracts § 149(1) (1932).

2. Ibid. See 2 Williston, Contracts § 404 (rev. ed. 1936), for a brief analysis of the
problems involved in correctly employing' the terminology of assignments.
3. 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 2, § 405.
4. 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1270 (1941); 2 Williston, Contracts § 410 (rev.
ed. 1936).
5. 4 Corbin, Contracts § 856 (1951).
6. 4 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 874-75.
7. In re Allied Products Co., 134 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1943).
8. 4 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 5, § 875.
9. C itol Distributors Corp. v. 2131 Eighth Ave., Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 842, 135 N.E.2d 726

(1956))under almost identical facts as the instant case prior to the granting of the liquor
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the deposit,' 0 the right being conditioned upon the state's acceptance or refusal
of the license application.
However, the subsequent grant of the license by the state raised the problem
whether the right to the refund was still an existing conditional right or had
become a non-existing right which would only come in esse when the license
was subsequently surrendered to the state. This distinction is important because courts of law will only recognize the transfer of rights which are in esse
at the time of the transfer." If the refund right was not in esse after the
license was granted, the assignee would have to look for his relief in equity. 2
The majority opinion assumed that the refund right, after the granting of
the license, became a non-existing right until the surrender of the license for
cancellation, and that equitable considerations would decide the respective
rights of the parties' 3 The dissenting opinion argued that the refund right was
a contingent existing right and that the assignee's rights should be the same
whether the money was refunded upon the refusal of the license application or
refunded upon the surrender of the license for cancellation. 14 Therefore, the
assignment of the refund right under an existing license would be a legal assignment and the assignee would take priority over the subsequent judgment
creditor.' 5
license, held, that the assignment of the deposit accompanying a license application was
an effective legal assignment of an existing fund and the assignee of such a right would
prevail over a subsequent legal lienor. "Future rights are rights which an as.ignor does
not have at the time of his assignment but which he expects will arise under a contract he
hopes to enter into.... But a right to a future performance jLnder a contract existing at

the time of assignment is an existing, not a future right. ..

Simpson, Contracts § 91

(1954). While the Restatement, Contracts § 154(1)-(2) (1932), does not expressly differentiate between "future" and "existing" rights, it, in effect, holds the former incapable of
effective assignment. However, the use of the terms "future" and "existing," as employed
by Simpson and the Restatement, require different interpretations, not within the purview
of this Note, when not employed within the realm of contracts. See note 17 infra, suggesting some of the difficulties encountered in the use of such terminology when the precise
question of contract rights is not involved.
10. N.Y. Alco. Bev. Control Law §§ 54(3), 55(1) require a deposit to accompany the
application for a liquor license. The deposit is refunded to the applicant in the event that
the license application is rejected.
11. Note, 21 St. John's L. Rev. 202 (1947).
12. Ibid.
13. The majority relied on the New York decisions which have interpreted the N.Y. Alco.
Bev. Control Law § 127(1): "If a person holding a license . ..cease to traffic in alcoholic
beverages during the term for which the license fee is paid, such peron may furrender such
license to the liquor authority for cancellation and refund.... The liquor authority shall
thereupon compute the amount of refund then due on said license for the unexpired term
thereof...

.

14. The dissenting opinion never expressly stated that the refund right in the instant
case was an existing conditional right and as such would be capable of effective legal
assignment. However, this is the only deduction that can be made from the dLsent's
argument that the instant assignment is directly analogous to the assignment in Capitol
Distributors Corp. v. 2131 Eighth Ave., Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 842, 135 N.E.2d 726 (195).
15. See note 9 supra.
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Whether such a refund right is a conditional existing right or a non-existing
right has been alluded to, but has never been the subject of thorough judicial
discussion. In Strand v.Piser'0 the New York Court of Appeals held that the
refund right became "due" on the date of the surrender of the license, and

clearly intimated that the refund right was not in existence before that time.
However, it would seem arguable on principle that, in view of a licensee's
statutory right to a refund if the license is surrendered before its full term
has expired, the licensee certainly has some existing right by virtue of his hold-

ing the license. 1 7 Such a right would seem directly analogous to that of a
promisee's right under a bilateral executory contract where the promisee must
first perform the conditions of the contract before the promisor's duty becomes
immediate. Prior to the time of performance the promisee has an existing

right which is generally capable of effective assignment. 18 In the instant case,
only the return of the license was necessary before the refund became immediately due.
The majority's assumption, that there was no existing right before the surrender of the license, raised the further problems of whether equity would uphold the assignment, and, if so, whether the interest arising out of such an

equitable assignment would prevail over the subsequent legal lien of the
judgment creditor. Both the majority and minority opinions agreed that equity
would recognize the assignment.

In deciding that the holder of a subsequent judgment creditor's lien would
prevail over an equitable assignee, the majority opinion primarily relied upon

the New York decisions involving a mortgage of after-acquired chattels. Although equity has upheld such mortgages as between the mortgagor and

mortgagee,19 the equities of such a mortgagee have been held ineffectual as
against the subsequent lien of a mortgagor's creditor because under the provi-

sions of the Lien Law an unrecorded mortgage is cut off by a judgment
creditor.20

16. 291 N.Y. 236, 52 N.E.2d 111 (1943).
17. Assuming that the refund right in the instant case was not an existing right, It
would seem that it was not analogous to a "mere naked hope" or a right under a contract
not yet formed. The licensee in the instant case had at the very least a "possibility" of
acquiring a refund coupled with his interest in the license. See 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1286 (1941). New York has held that an assignment of a claim expected to
be recovered from the successful completion of a lawsuit effective against subsequent
assignees and against attaching creditors of the assignee. Fairbanks v. Sargent, 117 N.Y.
320, 22 N.E. 1039 (1889); Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882). New York has also
consistently held that the assignment of an expectancy of inheritance is valid against
creditors of the testator-assignor. In re Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1942).
18. 4 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 5, § 875; Restatement, Contracts §§ 154(1), 172 (1932).
19. Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907). See also Osborne,
Mortgages §§ 37, 39-40 (1951) ; Walsh, Mortgages § 10 (1934). That the analogies drawn
between equitable mortgages and assignments are hardly satisfactory, see 2 Williston, Contracts § 413 (rev. ed. 1936); Williston, Transfer of After-Acquired Personal Property, 19
1-arv. L. Rev. 557 (1906).
20. N.Y. Lien Law § 230 provides: "Every mortgage . . . of goods and chattels . . .
which is not accompanied by an immediate delivery . . .is absolutely void as against the
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The question arises then, is the equitable assignment of rights, not within
the purview of the recording acts and therefore not dependent upon compliance
with the statute for its validity, effective against subsequent judgment creditors
of the assignor? It is submitted that an affirmative answer is required both by
precedent and principle and that the equitable lien of such an assignee should
prevail over subsequent creditors if no statute requires a different result.2 '
The dissenting opinion argued that the rules relating to mortgages of afteracquired chattels and the reasons therefor have never been applied to the assignment of a fund not yet in existence. The dissent relied on Niles v.
Mathzsa,22 in which a brewing company advanced the defendant a loan to
obtain a liquor tax certificate, taking an assignment of the certificate as security.23 As in the instant case, the holder of the certificate was entitled to a
refund of a pro rata amount of the tax paid if the certificate was surrendered
before its full term had expired. The plaintiff obtained a judgment lien on
the certificate. The appellate division,24 citing two early Court of Appeals
cases, 25 quoted Justice Story to the effect that ". . . courts of equity would
support the assignment ... not only of choses in action ... but also of things
which have no present, actual or potential existence, but rest in mere possibility; not, indeed as a present, positive transfer ... but as a present contract,
to take effect and attach as soon as the thing comes in essc." 25 The appellate
division in the Niles case rejected the argument that the principles applicable
to the mortgage of tangible chattels should apply to an equitable assignment,
and held that such an assignment should be treated as in the nature of a "chose
in action." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the subsequent judgposition than if he were a subsequent
ment creditor stood in no different
27
assignee of the same certificate.

creditors of the mortgagor . . . unless the mortgage . . . is filed as directed in this

article. . . ." Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632 (IS94), held,
that the mortgage of crops not yet planted at the time the mortgage instrument was
drawn up would not be effective against creditors of the mortgagor even though the
mortgage was fied and refiled under the provisions of the Lien Law. The Rocheter case,
in effect, held that it would be impossible effectively to record the mortgage on non-,xisting crops although the mortgage might operate as a present contract between the parties
which equity would enforce when the property was subsequently acquired by the mortgagor.
21. MacDonnell v. Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 193 N.Y. 92, 85 N.E. 801
(1903); AMeNeeley v. Welz, 166 N.Y. 124, 59 N.E. 697 (1901); Hovey v. Elliot, 118 N.Y.
124, 23 N.E. 475 (1890); Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New. York, 20 Colum. L.
Rev. 519, 530-531, 534 (1920); 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1236 (1941).
22. 162 N.Y. 546, 57 N.E. 1S4 (1900).
23. A liquor license can no longer be assigned. N.Y. Alco. Bev. Control Law § 114(2)(3). That a liquor license refund can be assigned appears to be settled law. Atty. Gen.
Ann. Rep. 149 (1935).

24. 20 App. Div. 4S3, 47 N.Y. Supp. 3S (3d Dep't 1897), aff'd, 162 N.Y. 546, 57 N.E.
184 (1900).
25. Fairbanks v. Sargent, 117 N.Y. 320, 22 N.E. 1039 (1SS9); Williams v. Ingerzoll, S9

N.Y. 503 (18S2).
26. Story, Equity jurisprudence, § 1394 (14th ed. 1918).
27. It is settled law in New York that between different assignees of the same cbosz
in action, the one prior in point of time will prevail. Muir v. Schenck, 3 Hill 228 (N.Y.
1842).
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The position taken by the Court of Appeals in the case of In the Matter of
Gruner,28 cited for support by both the majority and dissent in the present
case, would seem to be in accord with the Niles decision. In the Gruner case
a holder of a seat on the Stock Exchange assigned the proceeds of a future sale
of the seat as security for a loan. At the time of the assignment there was no
contract to sell the seat. The seat was sold and the court held that the assignee
was entitled to priority over the tax claim of the state, since the equitable
interest of the assignee was perfected at the time the funds came into existence,
before the state attached its lien.29
In the instant case the funds came into existence and the equitable interest
was perfected on July 8 when the license was surrendered, while the tax claim
of the city first became a judgment on August 13. It would seem then that the
equitable lien of the bank should have had priority over the subsequent judgment creditor's30lien, which stood in no better position than that of a subsequent assignee.
There can be no doubt that the majority in the instant decision was influenced by the preponderance of appellate decisions upholding the lien of a
subsequent judgment creditor over that of an equitable assignee. The majority
explicitly stated that "... we should follow the only previous decisions in this
State precisely in point." 31
If, as the majority stated, the equitable mortgage decisions were controlling,
then the legal lien of the creditor would always prevail over that of the equitable
assignee and reference to the time when the liens attached would be of no
importance. Nevertheless, in citing the Gruber decision, the majority must
have realized that the time when the equitable and legal liens attached was
among the decisive factors in that decision. It would seem then that the
majority opinion has taken the position that the appellate precedents should not
be changed even though literal legal and equitable reasoning should have
dictated a contrary result.

Attorney and Client -

Use of Recorded Confidential Conversation by

Legislative Committee.-The New York State Joint Legislative Committee
on Government Operations, while investigating the parole violation of plaintiff
Lanza, received a recording of a confidential conversation between Lanza and
his attorney, made when the attorney visited his client in the counsel chambers

of a county jail. The use by the Committee of the recording, the subject matter
of which was concededly within the scope of committee inquiry, was for the

purpose of investigation into the administration and operation of the parole
28. 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1946).

Chief Judge Conway, who wrote the ina-

jority opinion in the Gruner decision, concurred in the dissenting opinion in the Instant
-decision.
29. On remittal, 4 Misc. 2d 471, 74 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Surr. Ct. 1947), and upon additional
:proofs, it was held that part of the state's lien was perfected before that of the assignee.
30. See note 27 supra.
31. 2 N.Y.2d at 432, 141 N.E.2d at 576.
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department, and not for any action or proceeding against plaintiff. Plaintiffs,
Lanza and his attorney, brought this suit to enjoin the legislative Committee
from using or publicizing this privileged communication. The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, granted an injunction pendente lite. The appellate
division unanimously reversed and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the
New York Court of Appeals held, three judges dissenting, affirmed. Privileged
communications between attorney and client, even though surreptitiously recorded by state officers, may be used by a legislative committee when the subject matter of the communication is within its official purview and when such
investigation is neither directed against nor used to prejudice the rights of the
client. Lanza v. New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Government
Operations, 3 N.Y.2d 92, 143 N.E.2d 772, cert. denied, 26 U.S.L. Week 3127
(U. S. Oct. 21, 1957) (No. 377).
The confidential communication between attorney and client is the oldest
of the privileged communications, dating back to the sixteenth century. Existing at first only to the point of honor of the lawyer not to disclose confidential
matters arising from private consultations, the privilege later became that of
the client.' The United States generally accepted a broad interpretation of
this common-law doctrine from England,2 and in most states it is codified by
statute. 3 The privilege exists and lies within the discretion of the client
mainly to encourage full disclosure of all relevant facts by the client to his
attorney without apprehension on the part of the client that such material
may later be used against himself.
For the privilege to operate it is not necessary that litigation be pending by
or against the client,4 but a true attorney-client relationship must exist. The
attorney must be licensed,8 acting in the scope of his professional capacity0
and not merely as a business agent The privilege survives the client's death,8
but does not exist where the consultation is for an unlawful purpose.0 Nor does
the privilege exist when the communication is not confidential. If there is a
third party present at the time of the communication, whose presence is known
and who is not necessary to the services of either party, then such communication is not privileged and the matter may be testified to by any of the parties
1. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 (3d ed. 1940).
2. 8 id. § 2295.

3. In New York this privilege is embodied in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 353-54, and is
considered a codification of the common law: King v. Ashley, 179 N.Y. 231, 72 N.E. 105
(1904).
4. Root v. Wright, 84 N.Y. 72 (ISSI); Gage v.
S10 (4th Dep't 1897).
5. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2300.
6. Rosseau v. Bleau, 131 N.Y. 177, 30 N.E. 52
1, § 2303.
7. Avery v. Lee, 177 App. Div. 244, 102 N.Y.
3. In the Matter of Williams, 79 Mfisc. S05,
Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2323.
9. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2293.

Gage, 13 App. Div. 565, 43

N.Y.

Supp.

(1392); 3 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note
Supp. 12 (Ist Dep't 1907).
30 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Surr. Ct. 1942); 8
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involved.
In the case of an unperceived eavesdropper, it has been held that
his testimony is admissible but not that of the attorney." Professor Wigmore
has taken the position that "one who overhears the communication whether
with or without the client's knowledge is not within the protection of the
2
privilege ."
The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions in the federal courts the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel.' 3 In New York the right to counsel is likewise protected
by state constitutional guarantees.' 4 In Coplon v. United States the circuit
court ruled that "it is well established that an accused does not enjoy the
effective aid of counsel if he is denied the right of private consultation with
him."' 5
The use of electronic wire tapping and recording devices to obtain evidence
has confronted the courts with issues on the admissibility of such evidence and
its possible violation of due process of law. The Supreme Court, in Olmstead
v. United States,'0 ruled that surreptitious wire tapping was not a violation
of the fourth amendment granting freedom from illegal search and seizure and,
in the absence of a prohibitive statute, such evidence would be admitted in
the courts. Congress, in 1934, passed a statute forbidding not only unauthorized wire tapping by anyone, including federal officers, but also the use
of such illegally obtained evidence against the subject of the violation.' 1 Although this statute has been rigidly construed in the federal courts,18 its use
has been restricted thereto and held not to apply in state proceedings.10 In
New York, although unauthorized wire tapping has been a crime since 1909,20
nevertheless such illegally obtained evidence has been held admissible. 21
The use of electronic recording devices to eavesdrop does not come within
the purview of the federal act, since such does not affect interstate commerce.
10. Baumann v. Steingester, 213 N.Y. 328, 107 N.E. 578 (1915); Doheny v. Lacy, 168
N.Y. 213, 61 N.E. 255 (1901).

11.
12.

Erlich v. Erlich, 278 App. Div. 244, 104 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep't 1951).
8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2326.

13.

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

14. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.
15. 191 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952). That this
fundamental right to confer privately with counsel is upheld in New York, see People
v. Cooper, 307 N.Y. 253, 120 N.E.2d 813 (1954); People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480,
53 N.E.2d 356 (1944).
16. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
17. 47 U.S.CA. § 605 (1934).

18.

Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d

749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
19. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).

20. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1423(6). In 1938 the New York Constitution was amended
to allow wire tapping in proper cases. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12. However, a court
order must be obtained. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813(a).
21. In the Matter of Davis, 252 App. Div. 591, 299 N.Y. Supp. 632 (1st Dep't 1937);
People v. McDonald, 177 App. Div. 806, 165 N.Y. Supp. 41 (1st Dep't 1917); People v.
Katz, 201 Misc. 414, 114 N.Y.S.2d 360 (County Ct. 1952).
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At the time of the recording in the instant case, New York had no legislative
prohibition against eavesdropping by means of a recording device.22 Therefore, though the act of recording was repugnant, it was not illegal.
Can secretly made wire-tap or recorded evidence destroy private consultation
between attorney and client? The answer would seem to depend upon the type
of proceeding. The New York Court of Appeals has ruled consistently that any
state action interfering with confidential communications between attorney
and client in criminal proceedings against the client is a violation of the fundamental constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.2 3 Whether a surreptitious recording by state officers of a privileged communication may be regarded as admissible before an administrative committee under the same
principle permitting an eavesdropper to testify was one of the issues which
confronted the court in the instant case.
The majority supported its position by a strict interpretation of the
statutory attorney-client privilege, despite the announced policy of the court
in an earlier decision to construe section 354 liberally.2 4 Section 354 applies
the privilege to "... . any examination of a person as a witness unless the provisions thereof are expressly waived upon the trial or examination by... the
client." 25 Since the evidence in question was not used during an examination
of either party as a witness, the statute was held not to be controlling.
The court further supported its position by adopting a view previously advanced by the appellate division in Erlich v. Erlich,- 0 a matrimonial separation
action, where the husband was permitted to use secretly obtained wire-tap
evidence of telephone conversations between the wife and her attorney in order
to impeach the wife's testimony that her reconciliation was sincere. The
appellate division stated: "Where a communication between an attorney and
his client which they intended to be private and confidential is overheard by a
third party such person may be compelled to testify to what he overheard.
This is upon the theory that the communication itself is not incompetent, but
merely that the attorney himself is an incompetent witness in such matter. - T
Of those cases admitting illegally obtained wire-tap evidence and those permitting unperceived eavesdroppers to testify to a privileged communication,
it should be noted that the material was either admissible under the general
rules of evidence or that the material came from private sources. In the instant
case the surreptitious transcription was made by state officers. In Fusco v.
22. Effective July 1, 1957, N.Y. Pen. Law § 738 makes eavesdropping of telephone
or other private conversations by the use of electronic recording devices a felony. Swe
Comment, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 540 (1957).
23. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6. See People v. Cooper, 307 N.Y. 253, 120 N.E.2d 313
(1954); People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53 N.E.2d 356 (1944).
24. Buffalo Loan, Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Knights Templar and Masonic Mfut.
Aid Ass'n, 126 N.Y. 450, 27 N.E. 942 (1891).
25. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 354; cf. New York City Council v. Goldwater, 234 N.Y.
296, 31 NE.2d 31 (1940).
26. 278 App. Div. 245, 104 N.YS.2d 531 (Ist Dep't 1951). Note that such evidence
is no longer admissible in civil actions. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 345-a.

27. Id. at 245, 104 N.Y.S.2d at 533.

560
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Moses,28 an informer, at the direction of a state officer, was speciously working
with the defendant in a disciplinary proceeding and was present during attorney-client consultations, a fact situation analogous to the instant case. The
Court of Appeals refused to allow judgment against the subject of the intrusion because there had been a denial of his constitutional right to counsel.
However, in the instant case, the court reasoned that since the subject
matter of the recording was not to be used in an action or proceeding directed
against Lanza, his personal and property rights were neither prejudiced nor
injured. It was therefore the majority's opinion that the plaintiff's rights to a
fair trial and private consultation with his attorney were not prejudiced by
the committee. The majority implied, however, that were the privileged communication to be used in a criminal proceeding against Lanza, due process of
law would be violated and any judgment against him necessarily annulled. 0
In separate opinions three judges dissented, distinguishing other cases admitting illegally obtained evidence on the ground that the eavesdropper in
those cases was a private individual and the evidence potentially admissible,
while here state officers made the surreptitious recording. The minority contended that a court order would not have issued in advance to authorize this
interference with the lawyer-client communication, and that it was an unwarranted infringement on plaintiff's rights to counsel. However at the time
of the recording, such a practice was not illegal, and therefore no court order
was required. The minority did not consider significant the majority's distinction of the present case from one where there is an action pending against the
client, and advocated a hearing to give the plaintiffs a chance to show that their
rights were prejudiced.
Recent statutory changes in New York have partially solved the problem
which confronted the court in the instant case. A newly enacted section of
the Penal Law makes unauthorized eavesdropping by means of a recording
device a felony.8 0 The Civil Practice Act now renders inadmissible in civil
proceedings evidence obtained by illegal eavesdropping. However, this section
expressly permits such evidence to be used before legislative and administrative
bodies.81 It appears, therefore, that the decision in the instant case and the
expressed intent of the legislature concur in the opinion that an administrative
body should have access to such evidence.
However, the subsequent decision in the closely related case of In the Matter
of Reuter32 indicates that the courts will scrupulously protect the lawyer-client
privilege against disclosure by the attorney under testimonial compulsion in
the absence of waiver by the client. Contempt proceedings were brought against
Lanza's attorney, a co-plaintiff in the instant case, for his refusal to answer
questions based on the recording of the privileged communication. While
28. 304 N.Y. 424, 107 N.E.2d 581 (1952).
29. 3 N.Y.2d at 98, 143 N.E.2d at 775. For the basis of this dictum see notes 15 and
28 supra.
30. N.Y. Pen. Law § 738.
31. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 345-a.
32. 4 A.D.2d 252, 164 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1st Dep't 1957).
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acknowledging the right of the legislative committee to the use of the surreptitious recording of attorney-client communications, the court held that the
lawyer could not be compelled to disclose actions so closely related to the
consultation as in effect to amount to a disclosure of the communicationPm
The court stated: "Where there has been a flagrant and unprecedented violation
of the privilege, commensurate and extraordinary protection against compulsion
collaterally supporting proof of what the conference disof testimony to fill in
2 4
closed is warranted."
It is to be noted that in the instant case a legislative committee was performing a constitutional function and the right to the exercise of that function
clashed with the individual's constitutional right to counsel. The legislature,
by its remedy for infringements created by modern electronic eavesdropping,
has apparently concluded that the public welfare would profit by admitting
such evidence before investigating bodies. The courts, however, should be
zealous to prevent any abuse of the use of eavesdropping evidence of attorneyclient communications, so as to protect an individual's constitutional right to
counsel. Although no statutory provision has been made excluding such illegally recorded evidence of privileged communications in criminal proceedings against the victim of the intrusion, it is submitted that none is necessary
since the New York courts have clearly indicated that the rights of the client
will be protected upon a showing that the use of such evidence will prejudice
him.3

Bankruptcy - Wage Claim Priority for Union Welfare Funds.-A collective bargaining contract between union and employer required the employer to
pay a sum based on a fixed percentage of the monthly payroll to the union's
security fund to provide for a welfare program for the benefit of employees.
The employer having been adjudicated a bankrupt, a wage claim priority was
sought by the union security fund. The referee in bankruptcy disallowed the
claim of priority. The district court affirmed. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. Payments due to a
union welfare fund from a bankrupt employer are not entitled to a wage claim
priority. Local 140 Security Fund v. Hack, 242 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1957).
Priority was first given to employee wage claims in bankruptcy proceedings
by the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, but only in the amount of $25 and only for
labor performed within six months of the filing of the petition of bankruptcy 1
In the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, wage claims were lowered from the third to
33. The attorney was a "witness" within the express terms of N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§ 354, and therefore could not be compelled to testify.
34. 4 App. Div. 2d at 255, 164 N.YS.2d at 538.
35. People v. Cooper, 307 N.Y. 253, 120 N.E2d 313 (1954); Fusco v. Moses, 304
N.Y. 424, 107 N.E2d 581 (1952); People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 4S0, 53 N.E.2d 356

(1944).
1. 5 Stat. 444 (1841).
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the fourth class of priority claims, but the maximum amount was raised to

$50 while the six month time limitation was retained. 2 The Bankruptcy Act of
1898 maintained wage claims in the fourth order of priority. The maximum
recovery was raised to $300, but the large increase was limited by a reduction
of the time limitation to three months. 3 A 1926 amendment raised the maximum to $600 for each claimant. 4 The Chandler Act of 1938 raised the wage
claim priority to second position, but retained the $600 limitation and the three
month time period. 5 From the legislative history, it clearly appears that the
trend of congressional action has been towards more adequate protection for
the employees in the event of the employer's bankruptcy.
In order to qualify for the priority, the claim against the bankrupt must be
for wages, and must be owing to
or city salesmen .... 6

"...

workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling

A priority has been recognized in the case of welfare fund payments where
the claim was for portions of the employees' salaries, withheld by the employer
and owed to the union security fund by the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. 7 However, there is a conflict of opinion where the claim is for an
employer's unpaid contributions to the fund. In the case of In the Matter of
Brassel,8 cited and relied upon by the present court, the district court in the
Second Circuit refused to allow a wage claim priority for the employer's unpaid
contributions to the fund. In a more recent case, In the Matter of Otto,9 the
district court in the Ninth Circuit applied a more liberal interpretation to
the statute and granted a priority to an identical claim.
In the instant case, the court reasoned that the right of an employee to possible benefits under the welfare program is not the equivalent of wages, as
used in the Bankruptcy Act, and therefore denied the priority. The term
"wages" has repeatedly been defined as compensation for services rendered. 10
As the Otto case pointed out, the concept "wages" has expanded with the
introduction of various types of collective bargaining agreements, so that it
would seem far more reasonable to consider fringe benefits as an integral part
of the compensation for services rendered.
The concurring opinion in the instant case emphasized that the wage claim
priority should be denied on the further ground that the amounts were not
due to the employees designated by the Act, but rather to the security fund.
However, in In re Ross," where the funds consisted of salary withheld by the
2. 14 Stat. 530 (1867).
3. 30 Stat. 963 (1898).
4. 44 Stat. 662 (1926).
5.

11 U.S.C.A. 104 (a)(2) (Supp. 1956).

6. Ibid.
7. In re Ross, 117 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Cal. 1953); cf. Shropshire, Woodliff & Co. v.
Bush, 204 U.S. 186 (1907).
8. 135 F. Supp. 827 (N.D.N.Y. 1955).
9. 146 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
10. In re Dexter, 158 Fed. 788 (1st Cir. 1907) ; In re Gurewlitz, 121 Fed. 982 (2d
Cir. 1903); Black, Law Dictionary 1826 (3d ed. 1933).
11. 117 F. Supp. 346 (NJ). Cal. 1953).
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employer, the union fund was considered the assignee of the employees, designated in the collective bargaining agreement as the party to receive and manage
the employees' contributions.
Is there any substantial difference between a withholding of employees' wages
and a contribution by employers? Since union bargaining agreements are
negotiated on the basis of the total payments to be required of employers, the
only distinction would seem to be one of terminology. The ultimate monetary
obligation imposed upon the employer is the same in each case and the ultimate
benefits conferred upon the employees are identical.
An analogous problem existed in New York in cases involving general assignments. Conflicting opinions were delivered as to the meaning of wages.
Payments due to an insurance carrier for monthly premiums,12 and to a union
for welfare fundpaymnents, 13 were held not to be wages. However, at least one
decision held that group insurance payments were additional wages and were
therefore entitled to be treated as a preferred claim.' 4 The New York Legislature resolved the conflict by redefining the term "wages" so as to include all
compensation and benefits payable by an employer to or for the account of
the employeeY;
It appears evident that the fringe benefits which are usually included in collective bargaining agreements are considered not only by the employees and
unions, but also by employers, as additional forms of compensation for services
rendered, over and above the individual's salary. It is clear that a worker's
hourly rate would have to be raised considerably if vacation pay, sick leave,
severance pay, life insurance, hospitalization plans, and similar programs were
not included in the agreement under which he was employed. If the present
case stands as final judicial authority then Congress should follow the precedent
of the New York Legislature and supply a more realistic definition of the
'"wages" concept and the term "workmen," found in the priority section of the
Bankruptcy Act.
Constitutional Law - Attorney's Refusal To Answer Questions as Evidence

of Character.-Admission to the practice of law in California is subject to
certification by the State Committee of Bar Examiners that applicant is of
good moral character and that he does not advocate overthrow of the government by force. The burden of proof is upon the applicant. During bearings
before the Committee petitioner refused to answer questions as to present or
past membership in the Communist Party, asserting a right under the first and
fourteenth amendments to maintain lawful political beliefs and affiliations
immune from state power to investigate. The Committee refused to certify pe12. In the Matter of Well Bilt Box Spring Corp., 196 Mikc. 84S, S9 N.Y.S2d 763 (Sup.
Ct. 1949).
13. In the Matter of Hollywood Commissary, Inc, 195 Misc. 441, 37 N.Y.S.2d 625
(Sup. Ct. 1949).
14. In the Matter of Seaboard Furniture Mfg. Corp., S9 N.YS.2d 747 (Sup. CL 1943).
15. N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 22.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 26

titioner for the practice of law. Petition to the Supreme Court of California
for a rehearing was denied without opinion, three justices dissenting. On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, held, three Justices dissenting, reversed.
There was no evidence which justified the finding that petitioner failed to
establish that he did not advocate the overthrow of the government by force
or that he failed to establish his good moral character. Konigsberg v. State Bar,
353 U.S. 252 (1957).
A century ago, Chief Justice Taney recognized the inherent power of the
judiciary to select its officers and to determine their qualifications.1 Again
and again the courts have reaffirmed judicial power in this regard, refusing
whom they would when refusal was required under adopted practices. The
right to practice law is not a right inalienably guaranteed by the Constitution,2
and a state has the right to determine the persons who shall practice in its
courts. 3 However, in the proper exercise of the power to exclude, the courts
must observe the constitutional right of the applicant not to be excluded without
due process of law, for "the power . . . is not an arbitrary and despotic
one...."4
In the case at bar the examiners refused to certify petitioner as fit to practice
on the ground that he had not sustained the burden of proof required to establish his good moral character and to establish his non-advocacy of violent overthrow of the government. The state held that doubt as to his good moral
character was raised by the testimony of an ex-Communist who identified petitioner as an attendant at Communist Party functions in 1941, and by the
petitioner's invocation of the first amendment when questioned regarding
past and present Communist Party affiliations. The state further held that the
affidavits of forty-two witnesses attesting to his good reputation failed to dispel
the doubt.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Black put the issue: "Does the evidence
in the record support any reasonable doubts about Konigsberg's good character
or his loyalty to the Governments of State and Nation?" ' Assuming that the
testimony of the ex-Communist was true, and allowing that Konigsberg was
a member of the Communist Party in 1941, the Justice said ". . . the mere
fact of membership would not support an inference that he did not have good
moral character."8 In support of its position, the Court cited Wieman v.
Updegraff,7 which held that knowing activity within a subversive organization
must be distinguished from innocent activity, and therefore that the fact of
membership alone was insufficient proof of subversive activity. "Indiscriminate
classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of
arbitrary power." 8 Also cited was Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, decided
1. Ex Parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856).
2. In Re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 115 (1894).
3.

Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).

4. Ex Parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856).
5. 353 U.S. at 262.
6. Id. at 267.
7.

344 U.S. 183 (1952).

8.
9.

Id. at 191.
353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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on the same day as the principal case, in which the Court found that from the
admitted fact of membership in the Communist Party prior to 1940, there could
legitimately be drawn no inference of questionable moral character.
Turning to petitioner's refusal to answer questions regarding his Communist
Party membership, the Court found that the belief expressed by Konigsberg
during the hearings that the"... Constitution prohibited the type of inquiries
which the Committee was making '10 was advanced in good faith and that the
constitutionality of his objection to the questions did not require decision,
since "prior decisions by this Court indicate that his claim that the questions
were improper was not frivolous."" It was the Court's judgment that "... the
inferences of bad moral character which the Committee attempted to draw
from Konigsberg's refusal to answer questions about his political affiliations...
are unwarranted."'"
Justice Black's reasoning leads to the inescapable conclusion that the proper
test of the validity of a constitutional claim is the conscience of the claimant.
If the claim is advanced in good faith, it matters not whether it is objectively
valid, and no inferences may follow his refusal to answer. As a necessary consequence this leads to the awkward position of maintaining that although no
inference of bad moral character may be drawn from a valid claim of constitutional privilege or protection, neither can there be drawn any such inference
where the claim is objectively invalid so long as the claimant is in good faith.
Justice Black holds then that a valid claim and a bona fide invalid claim are
equally efficacious under the law; that the errant conscience of an individual
may stay the objective application of constitutional norms. Certainly good
faith, of itself, no matter how abundant or intense, can not cure an invalid
claim, nor can it be the test of that claim's constitutionality. Justice Black's
"good faith" reasoning frustrates a determination of the validity of an individual's claim of constitutional immunity except, presumably, on an appeal
from a contempt punishment imposed upon a claimant because of his defiance
of a court order directing him to answer; or on an appeal, from a decision by
a lower court to sustain a claim of immunity, by a state or administrative body
seeking the claimant's removal from office.
Regarding the validity of petitioner's claim of immunity, it is to be noted
that at the time of the hearings which were held in 1953 and early 1954,
the Communist Party had not yet been expressly proscribed. In 1950, however, Congress passed legislation controlling communist action organizations,
stating: "Although such organizations usually designate themselves as political
parties, they are in fact constituent elements of the world-wide Communist
movement and promote the objectives of such movement by conspiratorial and
coercive tactics. . . ,,13 Even though the Communist Party itself was not expressly proscribed until August 1954,14 should not the Court have recognized
10. 353 U.S. at 270.

11. Ibid.
Id. at 270-71.
13. S0 U.S.C.A. § 781(6) (1951).
14. 50 US.C.A. § 842 (Supp. 1956).
12.
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the fact that the Communist Party in 1953 came within the definition of a
"Communist Action Organization" set forth in the Internal Security Act of
1950? 15 And if it were not a lawful political party how could association with
it come within the purview of the first amendment; and how could questioning regarding such association be classified as inquiry into lawful political
affiliations?
If the Court had determined as a finding of fact that the Communist Party
in 1953 was a subversive organization operating behind a political facade,' 0
Konigsberg's invocation of the first amendment would have been invalid.
Justice Black, by restricting his opinion to the evidence in the record, made
a plausible argument, but only by evading the true issue in the case, the
relevancy of the questioning and constitutionality of Konigsberg's objections
to it.
Today, current, knowing membership in the Communist Party is no longer
a lawful political affiliation, protected by the first amendment from investigation.17 Nevertheless, although a refusal to answer a question concerning such
membership may be founded upon an invocation of the fifth amendment, and
although an inference of guilt does not necessarily arise therefrom, there still
remains the question whether a refusal to testify, standing unexplained, would
justify a state in denying admission to the practice of law.
In Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ.,18 the Court held that a teacher in
a city-operated college could not be summarily discharged for invoking the
fifth amendment privilege before a congressional committee. However, if the
bar committee in the present case had taken the position that the refusal to
answer questions of itself was sufficient to bar the applicant, such a position
would seem to be distinguishable from that in the Slochower case. Here the
applicant was given a hearing; in the Slochower case no hearing was held.
Here the investigation was to determine the party's qualifications; in the
Slochower case the investigation did not concern his teaching qualifications.
Moreover, in the Slochower case the party was questioned only as to past
membership in the Communist Party, while here there were questions regarding
present membership.
The Court in the Slochower case did not decide as a rule of law that no inferences may be drawn from the exercise of the fifth amendment privilege,'0
but did suggest that a ". . . proper inquiry would show Slochower's continued
employment to be inconsistent with a real interest of the State. '20 A hearing
before a Committee of Bar Examiners might well be such a "proper inquiry"
and as the Court in the Slochower case suggested, the Committee, in view of
15. 50 U.S.C.A. § 782(3) (1951).
16. Justice Jackson made such a finding of fact in his concurring opinion in American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 422 (1950).
17. See note 16 supra.
18. 350 U.S. 551 (1955).
19. "We do not decide whether a claim under the 'privileges or immunities' clause was
considered below. . . ." Id. at 555.
20. Id. at 559.
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petitioner's invocation of the fifth amendment privilege, might discover that
petitioner's admission to the Bar would be inconsistent with a real interest of
the State.
Finally, it would now appear reasonably certain that state courts may require
of their officers, as validly as a municipality may demand of its employees, 21
a sworn denial of knowing, present membership in the Communist Party as a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law.

Corporations - Enforceability of Restriction on Sale of Stock Not Stated
on Stock Certificate.-Plaintiff purchased two shares of stock of defendant
company with actual notice of a restriction thereon contained in the corporation's by-laws. The restriction was not stated upon the stock certificate as
required by statute. The certificate did state, however, that it was issued subject to the provisions of the by-laws. The plaintiff brought an equity action to
compel the corporation to transfer title to the stock and issue a new certificate
in his name. The defendant corporation charged that plaintiff was bound by
the option provision in the by-laws and had to offer the stock for purchase
by the directors. The court of chancery entered a decree for plaintiff purchaser. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Vermont, held, affirmed. Actual
notice of a restriction is immaterial where the corporation fails to state upon
the certificate its right to the option as required by statute.' Hopzwood v. Topsham Tel. Co., - Vt. -, 132 A.2d 170 (1957).
A characteristic of the private corporation from its inception was and is
the free transferability of shares of stock.2 As the corporate theory evolved,
however, there arose the desire to protect the corporate enterprise, particularly
the small corporation, from invasion by competitors and others adverse to the
interests of the corporation. Restrictions upon the transfer of stock provided
a means of maintaining control of the corporation in the hands of a selected
group. One of the most common types of restriction is the stock option, often
found in the by-laws, which gives a right of first refusal to the corporation or
other stockholders to purchase the stock of any stockholder wishing to sell.
Upon failure of the corporation or other stockholders to exercise the option,
the stockholder is then free to sell his stock upon the open market.
The validity of such restrictions has been attacked. It has been maintained
that such restrictions are void as against public policy and the right of alienability of personal property.3 However, the majority of jurisdictions have held
such restrictions valid where they were reasonable and did not amount to a
21. In Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), the Court held that a
municipality could require its employees to execute affidavits disclosing whether they were
members of the Communist Party, and that failure to comply was a valid ground for
dismissal.
1.
2.
3.

Vt. Stat. § 58S0 (1947); Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 15.
Ballantine, Corporations § 5 (rev. ed. 1946).
Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, S4 Md. 129, 34 At. 1127 (1896).
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4

total restriction upon alienation. As the highest court of Massachusetts said
in Barrett v. King,5 "stock in a corporation is not merely property. It also
creates a personal relation analogous otherwise than technically to a partnership. . . . [T]here seems to be no greater objection to retaining the right of
choosing one's associates in a corporation than in a firm."0
The issue in the instant case, however, was not the validity of the restriction
as such but rather the applicability of the restriction to a purchaser with notice,
where the corporation failed to comply with section 15 of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act. Section 15 states: "There shall be no lien in favor of a corporation upon the shares represented by a certificate issued by such corporation
and there shall be no restriction upon the transfer of shares so represented
by virtue of any by-laws of such corporation, or otherwise, unless the right
of the corporation to such lien or restriction is stated upon the certificate." 7
The purpose of section 15 is to give negotiability as far as is possible to certificates of stock.8 Utilizing this premise the court in the instant case held
that strict compliance with the provisions of section 15 by the corporation
was essential in order that the restriction in question be operative even against
a purchaser with notice. The court's argument was that by requiring compliance with the terms of the statute regardless of the circumstances involved
it maintained the negotiability of stock certificates in furtherance of the basic
aim of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.9 The literal interpretation of section
4. Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking Co., 128 Me. 34, 39, 145 AtI. 391, 393 (1929);

Fopiano v. Italian Catholic Cemetery Ass'n, 260 Mass. 99, 156 N.E. 708 (1927); Baumohl
v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 AtI. 118 (Ch. 1924); Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp.,
2 N.Y.2d 534, 543, 141 N.E.2d 812, 817 (1957). See also Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1159, 1168
(1930); Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 Va. L. Rev.
229 (1951).

5. 181 Mass. 476, 63 N.E. 934 (1902).
6. Id. at 479, 63 N.E. at 935.
7. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act has been adopted by and is in force in 47 of the
48 states, with Pennsylvania repealing the Uniform Act and enacting the Uniform Commercial Code, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (1954). The Uniform Stock
Transfer Act § 15 or a similar provision is in force in 46 of the 48 states. Annot., 29
A.L.R.2d 901 (1953). Pennsylvania has a similar provision, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A,
§ 8-204 (1954). Kansas had a similar provision, Kan. Sess. Laws 1939 c. 152, § 49, which
was repealed in 1947 when Kansas adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, but omitted
§ 15. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-4801 to 17-4822 (1949). North Dakota adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act in 1943 but omitted § 15 and has no similar provision. N.D. Rev.
Code §§ 10-1801 to 10-1823 (1943).
8. United States Gypsum Co. v. Houston, 239 Mich. 249, 252, 214 NAV. 197, 199

(1927).
9. The instant court held that the statement upon the certificate in question, to the
effect that it was issued subject to the by-laws, was inadequate to satisfy the requirements of § 15. The court said that the same statement had appeared on the certificates
without modification since the inception of defendant company and long before the
by-law in question had been adopted. Possibly the court felt that § 15 required a more
specific statement or one which would indicate the nature of the particular restriction.
In Alien v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 1 A.D.2d 599, 153 N.Y.S.2d 779 (2d Dep't 1956), the
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15 is taken by the majority of the jurisdictions that have decided the point. 10
The minority view holds that section 15 was intended to protect only innocent purchasers for value without notice of the restriction and not to protect
non-bona fide purchasers from the effect of conditions of which they were
fully cognizant."'
In Baurnol v. Goldstein,12 in which the purchaser was an officer of the corporation and had notice of the restriction in question, the New Jersey court
said: "This act [section 15],13 of course, was designed for the protection of
innocent purchasers of stock in the open market.., and not at all as a shield
by one with knowledge of a condition to unconscionably protect himself from
the consequences thereof."1 4 In the Indiana case of Doss v. Yingling,"; where
the facts were substantially the same as those of the Bamokl case, the court
also ruled that defendant was bound by the restriction.
The court in the instant case distinguished both the Baumohl and Doss cases
on the ground that the decision in each case was founded upon a breach by a
corporate officer of his fiduciary duty. A careful reading of both cases, however, indicates that the breach of fiduciary relationship was not the sole ground
for the decision in either case. Both courts pointed out that section 15 was of
no avail to the defendant, not only because of the breach of fiduciary duty

appellate division held that a statement on the certificate to the effect that it was issued
subject to the provisions of certain by-laws which were specified by number was suffiient
to satisfy the requirements of § 15 (N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 176). The Court of Appeals
agreed with the lower court, reversing on other grounds, 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E2d 812
(1957). There is no valid ground upon which to distinguish the two statements since in
both the prospective transferee is made aware of the existence of by-laws affecting the
certificate. The holding of the instant court upon this point seems unsound.
10. Hulse v. Consolidated Quicksilver lining Corp., 65 Idaho 763, 154 P2d 149
(1944); Hoosier Chemical Works, Inc. v. Brown, 200 Ind. 535, 165 N.E. 323 (1929);
Sorrick v. Consolidated Tel. Co., 340 Alich. 463, 65 N.W2d 713 (1954); Costello v.
Farrell, 234 Mlinn. 453, 48 N.W.2d 557 (1951). See Annot., 29 A.L.R.ld 501 (1953).
United States Gypsum Co. v. Houston, 239 linn. 249, 214 N.W. 197 (1927), is often
cited as holding this interpretation but the case deals with a lien rather than a restriction and contains language indicating that the decision rested at least partly upon the fact
that the pledgee in this case had no notice of the lien. Id. at 252, 214 N.W. at 199.
11. Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. S01 (1930); Baumohl v. Goldstein,
95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 Ad. 113 (Ch. 1924); Tomoser v. Kamphausen, 307 N.Y. 797, 121
N.E.2d 622 (1954). Writers upon the subject of restrictions assume the accepted view
to be that § 15 protects only purchasers without notice and cite the Baumobi and Doss
cases. See Cataldo, supra note 4; Ballatine, Corporations § 333 (rev. ed. 1946). However,
they offer no adequate explanation for cases holding contra. The precise Lue of notice
of the purchaser has not been decided in a sufficient number of the jurisdictions to distinguish a dear-cut majority and minority view but indications are that the literal interpretation of § 15 will be the majority view. The majority of the decisions in point at
presebt hold the literal interpretation. See Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 901 (1953).
12. 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 At. 118 (Ch. 1924).
13. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:S-41 (1952).

"14. 95 N.J. Eq. at 604, 124 Ad. at 121.
15. 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1930).
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involved, but also because the statute was designed to protect only innocent
purchasers without notice of the restriction.
New York has adopted the same interpretation. In Tomoser v. Kamphausen'6 the Court of Appeals held that a purchaser with notice of the
restriction was bound by it. In discussing the effect of section 15 the court
said: "However [section 15] . . . may be read, it does not affect the rule
that one may not purchase and obtain good title to stock in a corporation
when one knows of equities in another stockholder affecting such purchased
'17
stock."
The instant court argued that had the legislature intended that section
15 apply only to innocent purchasers without notice such an intent would
have found expression in the statute itself.' 8 As suggested by the court in the
Tomoser case, it is not to be presumed that the intent of the legislature is to
pass a statute which contradicts an established rule of equity. A purchaser of
an estate or interest with knowledge of any existing equitable right held by
another in the same subject matter is liable in equity to the same extent and
in the same manner as the person from whom he made the purchase. 19
The application of section 15 to a purchaser with notice is not clear from
the words of the statute itself. The minority view would seem more persuasive;
for a literal interpretation of section 15 more often than not will lead to the
anomalous situation
in which a party with the equities in his favor fails in an
20
equity action.

Hospitals - Liability for Negligent Medical Acts of Employees.-A
patient brought an action against a charitable hospital to recover for burns
suffered through the negligence of nurses in failing to inspect and remove sheets
which had become contaminated with an inflammable antiseptic. The sheets,
which were under the patient, were set afire when the surgeon employed a hot
cautery during the course of an operation. The hospital defended on the theory
that the injury resulted from the negligent performance of medical rather than
administrative acts by its employees. The plaintiff had judgment in the trial
court. The appellate division reversed and dismissed the complaint. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals, held, reversed. A hospital is liable for the negligent
medical acts as well as the negligent administrative acts of its nurses acting
16. 307 N.Y. 797, 121 N.E.2d 622 (1954). See Note, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 502-03 (1956).
17. 307 N.Y. at 801, 121 N.E.2d at 624.
18. Costello v. Farrell, 234 Minn. 453, 461, 48 N.W.2d 557, 561 (1951), quoted
with approval in instant case.
19. 2 Pomeroy, Equity § 688 (5th ed. 1941).
20. Sorrick v. Consolidated Tel. Co., 340 Mich. 463, 65 N.W.2d 713 (1954). Plaintiff
was at one time president of defendant corporation with knowledge of restriction not
stated upon certificate as required by law. Held, defendant corporation must transfer
stock on books to plaintiff, restriction not operative because of failure to comply with
§ 15 as embodied in state statute; cf. Age Publishing Co. v. Becker, 110 Colo. 319, 134
P.2d 205 (1943).
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within the scope of their employment. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143
N.E.2d 3 (1957).
As a result of the present decision, New York is now one of the growing
minority of states which have adopted, either as a matter of first impression or
by overruling older doctrines of charitable immunity, the rule that charitable
hospitals are responsible for the negligent torts of their servants committed in
the course of their employment. 1 In the majority of states today, however,
charitable institutions still enjoy varying degrees of immunity from liability
for the torts of their servants.2
Of the several theories advanced for the immunity of charitable institutions,
the oldest is the trust fund theory, which holds that "to give damages out of a
trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the
fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose." 3
New York repudiated this theory in Hordern v. Salvation Army,4 which declared the implied waiver theory to be the law of the state. This theory holds
that one who accepts the benefits of a charity impliedly waives his right to
recover damages for torts committed by the servants of the institution. In
1937, New York expressly rejected the implied waiver theory in Sheehan v.
North Country Community Hospital.5
Refusing to extend the implied waiver theory to intentional torts, the Court
of Appeals of New York in Schloendorff v. Society of the New York2 Hospitala
had earlier applied its peculiar independent contractor theory. It held that a
patient could not recover from a charitable hospital for injuries sustained
as the result of an operation performed on her without her permission, by two
physicians, one of whom was on the hospital staff. The court reasoned that
1. The jurisdictions that reject charitable immunity are Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hamphire, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Puerto Rico, Vermont, and Washington. See case. cited in
Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 310, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Annot, 25 A.L.R.2d
29 (1952); 14 CJ.S. Charities § 75 (1939); Harper & James, Torts §§ 29.16-29.17 (1956);
Comment, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 493, 501 (1956).
2. Nine states, Arkansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wisconsin, grant full immunity to charitable institutions
under the trust fund theory. In addition, five states, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, grant partial immunity under the trust fund theory by limiting
execution of judgment to funds that are not part of the institution's trust fund. Ten
states, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, Texas, and Virginia, preclude suits by both paying and non-paying beneficiaries of charitable institutions under the implied waiver theory and allow only strangers to
recover. Five states, Maine, Montana, Nevada, West Virginia, and Wyoming, preclude
suits by beneficiaries but have no cases involving strangers. For cases in support of the
preceding statements see Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952); 14 C.J.S., Charities § 75 (1939); Harper & James, op. cit.
supra note 1; Comment, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 493, 501 (1956).
3. Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Cl. & Fin. 507, 513, S Eng. Rep. 1503, 1510 (H.L. 1846).
4. 199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.E. 626 (1910).
5. 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28 (1937).
6. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
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doctors and nurses were not servants of the hospital, but rather independent
contractors, because the hospital lacked the power to control them in the
performance of professional duties, and therefore could not be held responsible
for their torts.
Ten years later the Court of Appeals extended the independent contractor
doctrine when it held in Philips v. Buffalo General Hospital' that the hospital
was not liable for the tort of an orderly committed while the orderly was doing
work usually done by a nurse. Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospitals comple-

mented the decision in the Philips case. The court there held that if a doctor
or a nurse in the employ of a hospital committed a tort while engaged in
work of a non-professional nature, it would subject the hospital to liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. "The liability depends not so much
upon the title of the individual whose act or omission caused the injury, as
upon the character of the act itself." 9
From the Philips decision to the present time the courts have gradually
limited the doctrine. In Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc.10 a company doctor
injured a job applicant while taking a blood test. The court held the company
liable because it, and not the doctor, was responsible for the decision to take
the blood. "We look to the 'medical'-'administrative' distinction only when the
negligence occurred during treatment or care of a patient, and where the physician acts independently."" In Berg v. New York Soc'y for the Relief of the
Crippled,1 2 the court held that the doctrine would not be applied to relieve the
hospital of liability in cases involving negligence of non-professional, salaried
employees, regardless of the fact that they may have been engaged in the performance of medical rather than administrative acts. This case had the effect
of overruling the Philips case. Thus, the independent contractor doctrine had
been so limited that a hospital, charitable or profit-making, 8 could escape
liability only for torts committed during the treatment or care of a patient, by
a doctor or nurse who was selected with due care,4 and who was engaged in
the independent performance of a professional act.'
On two occasions prior to the present case the Court of Appeals intimated
that the independent contractor doctrine had outlived its usefulness. In the
Berg case the court said, "whatever be the ultimate fate of the Schloendorff
rule, this case need not be pushed into the Schloendorff mold."'1 And in Becker
v. City of New York, "nor will it be necessary for us to decide the 'ultimate fate
of the Schloendorff rule' in this case, for this court has held that the rule is not
7. 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924).
8. 284 N.Y. 176, 30 N.E.2d 373 (1940).
9. Id. at 180, 30 N.E.2d at 374.
10. 308 N.Y. 116, 123 N.E.2d 801 (1954).
11. Id. at 122, 123 N.E.2d at 804.
12. 1 N.Y.2d 499, 136 N.E.2d 523 (1956).
13. Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, 277 App. Div. 572, 101 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1st
Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 870, 100 N.E.2d 51 (1951).
14. Bryant v. Presbyterian Hospital, 304 N.Y. 538, 110 N.E.2d 391 (1953).
15. 1 N.Y.2d at 503, 136 N.E.2d at 524.
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applicable to negligent employees where the hospital involved is operated by
the State....,16
In the instant case, Judge Fuld, writing for the majority, set forth three
reasons for the decision to abandon the rule of the Schloendorff case. First, it
was pointed out that the difficulty the courts have had in logically and consistently applying the professional-administrative test can produce only confusion, doubt, and uncertainty. 17 This problem is amply demonstrated by the
history of the instant case itself. The jury found the negligence to be an administrative act. The appellate division reversed the trial court, two of the
five justices voting to affirm the trial court. Thus, while the distinction between
medical and administrative acts was verbally clear, its application was a matter
of dispute.
Second, it was argued that the reasons originally given for the decision in the
Schloendorif case are not sufficiently strong today to justify the continued existence of the doctrine. The independent contractor theory, by holding salaried
doctors and nurses to be independent contractors, was held to be". ...inconsistent with what they have been held to be in every other context. ...,,1
It was pointed out as anomalous that if a nurse injured a patient while performing a medical act, she was an independent contractor; while if she were to
injure herself while performing the same act she would be an employee entitled
to compensation. It was also noted that the city is liable for the torts of doctors
and nurses employed in its hospitals under the ordinary rules of respondeat
9
superior."
The third reason for abandoning the Schlocndorif rule was that the rule
had outlived its usefulness. It was pointed out that the rcspondcat superior
rule in other jurisdictions had imposed no great hardship on charitable hospitals.
Moreover such hospitals could easily protect themselves by obtaining liability
insurance.
Chief Judge Conway, in a separate concurring opinion, took the position that
it was unnecessary to overrule the Schloendorif case on the facts before the
court, since it appeared to him that the negligent act was an administrative
rather than a medical one. However, it was to avoid this precise question, which
had produced so much confusion in this case as it had in others, that the
majority of the court chose to abandon the independent contractor doctrine.
"[W]e do not consider it either wise or necessary again to become embroiled
in an overnice disputation as to whether [the negligent act] . . . should be
labeled administrative or medical."20
The independent contractor theory, like its predecessors, the implied waiver
theory and the trust fund theory, was in fact a carefully constructed legal fiction
designed to support a judicial policy. The reasons for the policy were, in the
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

2 N.Y.2d 226, 233, 140 N.E.2d 262, 267 (1957).
See also Comment, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 49S, 505 (1956).
2 N.Y.2d at 664, 143 NJ.2d at 7.
N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § S; 2 N.Y.2d at 235, 140 N.E.2d at 263.
2 N.Y.2d at 661, 143 N.E.2d at 5.
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main, economic. The economic position of hospitals in general has improved
to the point where it is no longer necessary to protect them, and the theories
which were ostensibly the basis of the law are too weak to stand by themselves.
Hospitals are now liable under the rule of respondeat superior the same as any
other employer, and properly so.
Insurance - tAct of War" Defined.-Plaintiff, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy, brought an action to recover under a double indemnity provision for the death of the insured in the Korean conflict. An exclusionary clause
provided that this provision would be inapplicable if death occurred "as a result
of an act of war." From a judgment for the insurer the beneficiary appealed.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, held, one justice dissenting, affirmed. An
"act of war" may occur even though a declared state of war does not exist.
Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 388 Pa. 499, 131 A.2d 600 (1957).
The interpretation of war clauses' has been a breeding ground for intense
controversy and litigation. The problem centers about the definition and limitation of the word "war" in three situations: (1) where the insured died prior to a
declaration of war by Congress, as in the Pearl Harbor cases;" (2) where the
insured died during extended hostilities in which there never was a formal
declaration of war, as in the Korean conflict; 3 (3) where the insured died after
the surrender of a belligerent nation in a formally declared war, but prior to an
official declaration of peace, for example, where insured died as a result of an
4
explosion after Japan surrendered.
In the third situation, where the insured dies after the fighting has stopped,
the courts are in almost unanimous agreement that, for the purposes of the
insurance contract, the war has ended.5 This is due to the fact that there is
no constitutional requirement for a legislative declaration of peace.
In the first two situations the courts are divided on whether to give the word
"war" a strict and technical denotation 6 requiring a formal .declaration by
1. Two types of war clauses are currently in use. "Status war" clauses are those which
exclude from coverage death from all causes while in the military in time of war. "Result"
clauses exclude from coverage death which results from military service.
2. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946), held that for the
purpose of the insurance policy war did exist on Dec. 7, 1941, prior to a formal declaration
on Dec. 8th. Contra, Savage v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1944);
Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944); West v. Palmetto
State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475 (1943).
3. Carius v. New York Life Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. I1. 1954); Welsman
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Western Reserve Life
Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W.2d 554 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928
(1954). All held that the conflict in Korea was war within the meaning of an insurance
policy. Contra, Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202 (1953).
4. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 79 Ga. App. 336, 53 S.E.2d 571 (1949), held no war
for insurance purposes.
5. See, e.g., Stinson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
6. Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202 (1953). Contra,
Stanbury v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 26 N.J. Super. 498, 98 A.2d 134 (L. 1953).
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Congress, which alone has the constitutional power to declare war,7 or whether
to apply its ordinary and generally accepted meaning, that there are actual
hostilities between the forces of two or more nations. s
While adhering to its holding in Beley v. Pennsy,1vania Mit. Life Ins. Co.,0
that there can be no war without a legislative declaration, the court in the
instant case found that the hostilities in Korea constituted acts of war. The
court cited the sinking of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbor in 1893 and
the bombing of the gunboat Panay as similar incidents which did not result in
a state of war, but which were surely acts of war.' 0 Justice Musmanno, who
wrote the concurring opinion in the Beley case, strongly dissented, pointing out
that the instant case

"...

accomplishes the reversal of a previous decision with-

out a specific statement to that effect."' i
It is well settled that when an insurance contract is open to two constructions,
so that the intent of the parties is uncertain, the interpretation most favorable to
the insured will be adopted.' 2 By distinguishing between declared and undeclared war, and applying the above principle, the authorities which support
the technical interpretation of the term "war" resolve the controversy in favor
of the insured. 13 They also rely on cases such as Bishop V.Joncs,'4 which held
that". . . there can be no war by its government, of which the court can take
judicial knowledge, until there has been some act or declaration ... recognizing
its existence by that department of government clothed with the war making
power."'15 The present court, in the Beley case, followed the Bishop case and
held that the existence of a state of war is a political, not a judicial question,
and therefore reasoned that the parties in using the word "war" must have contemplated declared war. This, the court added, would give the term "war"
a "uniform standard" of interpretation in insurance contracts.
On the other hand, the contention that the term "war" should be given the
meaning that common speech imports seems to be supported by the greater
weight of authority. The United States Supreme Court in 1800, during a period
of hostilities between the United States and France, held that war could exist
without a formal declaration.' 6 This view was upheld during the Civil War,' 7
7. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, c. 11.
S. Langlas v. Iowa Life Ins. Co., 245 Iowa 713, 63 N.W.2d S5 (1954).
9. 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202 (1953).
10. 3S8 Pa. -,
131 A.2d at 606.
11. Id. at -, 131 A.2d at 619.
12. 13 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 7401 (1943).
13. See, e.g., Savage v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1944).
14. 28 Tex. 294 (1366); accord, Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co,
251 US. 146 (1919).
15. 2S Tex. at 319.
16. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 36, 39 (1300). "[E]very contention of force, between
two nations . . .is not only war but public war."
17. Prize Cases (The Amy Warwick), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 663-69 (1S62). "If a
war be made by invasion ... the President... is bound to accept the challenge vithout
waiting for any special legislative authority ....
It is none the less a war... [Alnd no
name given to it by him or them could change the fact."
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and again in the Korean conflict.'
The cases which support the technical construction of the term "war" fail
to make a distinction between its use in a private contract, where the parties
can give it any definition which will not infringe on public policy, 19 and its use
in public law 20 An elementary principle in the interpretation of an insurance
contract or any other contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties at the
time the contract was made.21 In order to achieve this, the language of the
contract must be given its common and popular meaning 2 2 If after the application of this principle the terms still remain ambiguous, then, and only then,
should they be resolved liberally in favor of the insured. 23 The well known
purpose of a war clause is to protect the insurance company against the added
risk due to increased hazards to human life during hostilities as opposed to
peacetime activities. 24 This risk is just as great in an undeclared war as in one
which has been given a legislative sanction 25 through a formal declaration.
Obviously the intention of the insurer must be apparent to an ordinary insured
who is not familiar with the delicacy of legal interpretation.
In the instant case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, while not expressly reversing its previous decision in the Beley case, indicated a more liberal trend
by construing a distinction between "war" and an "act of war." Such a distinction does not seem to be a valid one because, as is pointed out in the dissent
".. . the Majority's Opinion . . . hinges the explanation of its decision on the
word 'act,' when the emphasis, of course, should be on the word 'war.' ,,20
It is submitted, therefore, that the Beley case should have been expressly
overruled.
It seems that a liberal interpretation of the word war is the more reasonable
18. Justice Jackson in Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (concurring opinion), states, "Of course a state of war may in fact exist without a formal
declaration." See note 3 supra.
19. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1948).
20. They apply to insurance contracts the rule of Bishop v. Jones, 28 Tex. 294 (1866),
which involved the question of whether a citizen of a nation at war could sue in the court
of the other nation.
21. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 811 (1947); 3 Williston, Contracts § 607 (rev. ed. 1936); Restatement, Contracts
§ 230 (1932).
22. Aschenbrenner v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 292 U.S. 80 (1934). But
see Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 240, 95 A.2d 202, 213 (1953),
where Justice Musmanno, in his concurring opinion, admits that ".

.

. to deny that the

Korean military action is not war in its popularly accepted meaning is to deny the evidehco
of one's senses," but still concurs in the opinion that courts cannot take judicial notice of
war without a declaration by Congress.
23. Restatement, Contracts § 236 (1932); 3 Wiliston, Contracts § 621 (rev. ed. 1936).
24. Christensen v. Sterling Ins. Co., 46 Wash. 2d 713, 716-17, 284 P.2d 287, 289 (1955).
25. Many of the courts take judicial notice of legislative sanction to the Korean conflict
because of the numerous acts whereby Congress provided money and other benefits, See
e.g., Carius v. New York Life Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 388, 390-91 (S.D. Ill. 1954).
26. 388 Pa. -, 131 A.2d at 616. This author, however, does not agree with the dissenting opinion's conclusion that war should be given its technical interpretation.
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since it gives effect to the obvious intent of the parties concerned. Although the
liberal interpretation requires the courts to determine what constitutes a war.
it avoids any fine distinctions and artificial standards which prejudice the
meaning of the contract.- 7

Insurance -

Violation of Law as a Bar to Recovery on Policy.-The in-

sured deliberately set fire to a house for the purpose of collecting fire insurance.
The fire commenced prematurely and the insured was burned to death. Plaintiff

beneficiary brought this action to recover under an accident policy, claiming that
the insured died by accidental means. The lower court entered judgment in

favor of defendant. The intermediate appellate court reversed. On appeal to
the Supreme Court of Illinois, held, three justices dissenting, affirmed. The
term "accidental means" is synonymous with "accidental result." An insurer's
liability will not be limited by the insured's violation of the law unless such a
clause is inserted in the policy. Taylor v. John Hancock Mitt. Life Ins. Co.,
11 Ill. 2d 227, 142 N.E.2d 5 (1957).
The meaning of the term "accidental means" must be based on the understanding of the contracting parties. Since the insurer has chosen the language
of the contract, any ambiguity will be resolved in the insured's favor.1 The
average man thinks of an accident as an unexpected occurrence, a result which
does not ordinarily follow,2 and many courts have held that to change this concept and disallow recovery on a strict interpretation of the term "accidental
means" would substantially impair the coverage intended by the parties to the
contract. 3
In the instant case the insurance policy in issue provided: "Death benefits
will be paid if death occurs as result of bodily injury sustained solely through
external, violent and accidental means, directly and independently of all other
causes." The first issue presented was whether the insured's death was by
accidental means. The court equated "accidental means" with "accidental
result," and permitted recovery.
In United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Bar;y,4 the policy contained the same
clause as found in the present case. The United States Supreme Court allowed
recovery where the insured jumped from a platform four or five feet high and
sustained injuries from which he subsequently died. In a New York case con27. It is very surprising that after the language used by the court in Beley v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. 373 Pa. 231, 237, 95 A.2d 202, 205 (1953), some insurance companies

still do not distinguish between "declared war" and "undcclared war" but per:ist in using
vague expressions, such as, "act of war."
1. Vance, Insurance § 180 (3d ed. 1951).
2. Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
3. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 4(l, 493 (134). The disssenting
opinion by Justice Cardozo is the bais from which the liberal interpreters argue, Accord,
Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mlut. Acc. ss'n, 295 N.Y. 294, 302-03, 67 X.E2d 245, 252

(1946).
4. 131 U.S. 100 (ISS).
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taining the same clause, the court allowed recovery where the insured, in an
attempt to relieve an earache, took an overdose of drugs from which he died.a
These decisions were based on the fact that although the act done was intended,
the result was unexpected, and therefore accidental within the meaning of
the policy.
The dissent in the present case conceded that accidental means and accidental
result were synonymous, but argued that the insured should have realized that
the fire and his resulting death were the natural and probable consequences
of his acts, and therefore not within the coverage afforded under the accident
policy. Under this theory proof of the insured's negligence would be a valid
defense to a claim under an accident policy. Such a theory has heretofore had
no acceptance in insurance law.0 In a Kentucky case where the insured was
burned due to the use of an inflammable substance near a hot stove, the court
held that the employment or use of inflammable materials near the source of
the heat may be negligence, but negligence which causes or contributes to the
result does not operate to remove such result from the category of those caused
7
by accidental means.
It was further contended by the dissent that the qualifying language of the
policy, "independently of all other causes," indicates that a different construction was intended in this case. The dissent interpreted the word "causes" to
refer to "cause of the accident," and therefore where nonaccidental factors
contributed to the accident the clause "independently of all other causes" was
violated. However the word "causes" has been held to mean "cause of death,"
and not "cause of the accident." 8 This would require only that the proximate
cause of death be the accident. In the present case the death was caused by
the fire, there was no intervening cause, and death was simultaneous with the
accident. Therefore, the death did occur "independently of all other causes."
To hold as the dissent did once again would interject the element of negligence
to relieve the insurer from liability.
Even though the policy contained no "violation of the law" provision, the
insurer in the present case disclaimed liability on the basis that the insured
met his death while engaged in a violation of the law. A serious violation of
the law at early common law resulted in the forfeiture of the felon's property, so
that nothing passed by inheritance. 9 In insurance cases the problem is not
one of forfeiture but one involving a contractual relationship. Does the insurer assume the risk of injury or death caused by a violation of the law? The
United States Supreme Court has held that the insurer does not assume the
risk. The Court contended that "public policy forbids the insertion in a contract of a condition which would tend to induce crime, and as it forbids the
introduction of such a stipulation it also forbids the enforcement of a contract
5. Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 140, 7 N.E.2d 18 (1937).
6. 6 Couch, Insurance § 1476 (1930).
7. Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Milner, 289 Ky. 249, 158 S.W.2d 429 (1942).
8. Cramer v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 18 N.J. Misc. 367, 13 A.2d 631 (Cir.
Ct. 1940).
9. 1 Bishop, Criminal Law § 968 (9th cd. 1923).
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under circumstances which cannot be lawfully stipulated for."' 0 In Hatch
v. Mutal Life Ins. Co.," in which a woman died due to an illegal abortion,
the court also held for the insurer. The decision was based on public policy,
rather than a specific clause within the insurance policy which might have excluded coverage. A Colorado court agreed, holding that a provision in an insurance contract excepting death due to violation of the law was superfluous.
It was held to be a mere statement of public policy, which controls regardless
of contract.- 2
Although the insured in the present case was engaged in a violation of the
law which contributed to his death, the court held that there was no public
policy which would preclude the beneficiary from recovering. In a previous
Illinois case, recovery was allowed where the insured was executed for a crime.1 3
The recovery was based upon the fact that forfeiture of a felon's property due
to his violation of the law has been abolished.' 4 This was held to apply to a
violation of the law in relation to insurance policies.
Decisions such as the instant one are inducing insurers to limit their liability
by the insertion of violation of the law clauses. The effect of this often is to
limit the insured's coverage far beyond his realization. Clauses such as "accident encountered while violating the law" have been at times construed
literally, so that no causative connection between violation and injury was
required to be shown.1 5 This type of clause may be sufficient to exempt the
insurer from liability for death or injury occurring in an automobile accident
while the insured is violating any of the numerous provisions of traffic laws
and ordinances.' 6 The term law, used in a similar connection, has been held
to include a municipal ordinance.' 7
One of the most adequate steps taken in solving this problem can be found
within the New York Insurance Law. One section prevents an insurer from
limiting his liability by the insertion of a violation of the law clause.' 8 Under
a subsequent section an insurer's liability in relation to the violation of the law
is defined: "The insurer shall not be liable for any loss to which a contributing
cause was the insured's commision of or attempt to commit a felony or to
which a contributing cause was the insured's being engaged in an illegal occupation."' 9 "Contributing cause" means that the attempt or crime or illegal
occupation must be more than an existing situation; it must be a factor causing
such injury. A felony connotes a serious crime. A person "engaged in an illegal
occupation" is in continuous violation of the law and in that respect is com10. Burt v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 137 U.S. 362, 365-66 (1902).
western Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U.S. 234, 249-46 (1912).
11. 120 Mass. 550 (1S76).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Accord, North-

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Roma, 97 Colo. 493, 50 P.2d 1142 (1935).
37, 83 N.E. 542 (1907).
Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 "11.
3.
US. Const. art. I, § 9, cl.
Flannagan v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 22 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1927).
Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Eaton, 84 F.2d 52S (4th Cir. 1936).
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Guenther, 281 U.S. 34 (1930).

18. N.Y. Ins. Law § 155(2).
19. N.Y. Ins. Law § 164(3)(B)(10).
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mitting a serious crime. New York has thus safeguarded the interests of the
insured while maintaining a sound public policy on death caused by serious
violation of the law.

Labor Relations - Right of a State To Enjoin Picketing for Organizational
Purposes.-Plaintiff owned and operated a small business in Wisconsin. Defendants sought to unionize some of plaintiff's employees and, failing to do so,
began to picket plaintiff's place of business in a peaceful manner. The plaintiff
was granted an injunction by the trial court. Upon appeal, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reversed. Upon reargument, it withdrew its first opinion and
affirmed the granting of the injunction, finding that the picketing was in violation of a state statute which declared it an unfair labor practice for an employee
to ". . . coerce, intimidate or induce any employer to interfere with any of
his employes in the enjoyment of their legal rights. . . ." On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, held, three Justices dissenting, affirmed. An
injunction against picketing for the purpose of forcing an employer to apply
pressure upon his employees, where such picketing is forbidden by state law,
is not violative of the fourteenth amendment. Teamsters Union, AFL v. Vogt,
Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
It has been held that the right to publicize the facts of a labor dispute
through peaceful picketing is protected under the first amendment.' However, a state, in order to secure the welfare of its citizens, may enjoin picketing
where it is in violation of the declared policy of the state
The instant case was concerned with the right of a state to enjoin picketing
for organizational purposes. The general problem has been discussed repeatedly
by the Supreme Court. In 1953 the Court held in Plumbers Union v. Graham
that where picketing for organizational purposes was in violation of a state's
"right to work" act, it might properly be enjoined. Presented with the problem
of enjoining organizational picketing, the Court in 1950, in Building Service
Employees Union v. Gazzam, 4 ruled that since state policy prohibited interference by an employer in his employees' choice of bargaining representative,
the state might enjoin the picketing as violative of state law. These cases
appeared to settle the law to the effect that a state might enjoin peaceful picketing for organizational purposes where the object or effect of the picketing was
to coerce violation of state law. The fact that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the instant case in order "to restate the principles" is ample evil. Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940);
Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
2. Building Service Employees Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Teamsters v.
Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Ct., 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
3. 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
4. 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (hotel picketed for purpose of pressuring employer to obtain
consent of employees to a demand that they join the union).
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dence that its decisions have not been accepted without question. A continued
ambiguity hovers over the discussion because of the Court's early decision in
Thornhill v. Alabama.5
Thornhill v. Alabama went further than any other case in equating, indiscriminately, the right to publicize the facts of a labor dispute with free speech.
The case involved an Alabama statute prohibiting all picketing in very sweeping terms. The Court declared the statute unconstitutional in equally broad
phrases. The present Court distinguished the Thornhill decision, suggesting that
if the Alabama statute had been aimed at specific types of picketing, the opinion
would not have gone to the extremes which it did in stating that the dissemination of facts through peaceful picketing ...
must be regarded as within that
area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. 0 It should be
noted that in the Thornhill opinion, the Court, while offering this strong
support to the right to picket where its primary purpose is to disseminate facts,
observed, almost incidentally, that "... the rights of employers and employees
...are subject to modification or qualification in the interests of the society
in which they exist. This is but an instance of the power of the State to set
the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants."7 It was this
idea, almost totally obscured by the improvident generality of the Thornhill
rule, taken literally, that was to be recalled frequently in the years to come and
to take predominance in influencing the decision of later cases.
The following year the right to picket received further support in AFL v.
Swing,s where it was held that a state might not enjoin picketing solely because
there was no labor dispute between an employer and his own employees.
However, on the same day that the Court decided the Swing case, it held
that a state might issue an injunction against picketing which involved violence
or against peaceful picketing where the unlawful nature of certain acts had
"enmeshed" it in a "context of violence. ' In other opinions it was decided that
a state had the right to localize a labor dispute to a particular industry, 10 and
to enjoin peaceful picketing where it violated a state criminal statute." The
latter decision was afterwards applied in cases where the statute violated had
no criminal sanctions. So, in the case of Tcamstcrs Union, AFL v. Hanke,'
peaceful picketing, aimed at unionizing the business of a self-employer with
no employees, was held, where it infringed on a state law, to be the proper
object of an injunction. The Hanke decision was one of three handed down on
the same day. Another was the Gazzam decision. In the third, it was held that
a state might enjoin picketing where it violated a state law against race discrimination.13 These three cases clearly indicated the intention of the Court to swing
5. 310 US. 88 (1940).
6. Id. at 102.
7. Id. at 103-04.
8.

312 U.S. 321 (1941).

9.
ilk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
10. Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 US. 722 (1942).
11. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
12.

339 U.S. 470 (1950).

13.

Hughes v. Superior Ct., 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
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away from the doctrine of Thornhill v. Alabanma and to retract the promise,
which that case had made, of broad protection for picketing.
Though Thornhill has never been specifically overruled, it has been questioned and limited by the Court itself. Although much of the opinion was
dictum, the generality of its language and its indiscriminate use of the Constitution as justification for the right to picket have prompted labor-union lawyers
to recur to its use as if it had never been qualified. In that sense it remains a
disquieting influence throughout attempts to settle the law on the subject.
The dissenting opinion in the instant case criticized the majority for abandoning the Thornhill principles. The dissent further stated that the instant decision
was contrary to the holding in AFL v. Swing, and argued that the Swing case
gave first amendment protection to organizational picketing on a factual record
which could not be distinguished from that presented here. 14 Although in the
Swing case, as in the instant case, an employer was picketed for the purpose
of forcing his employees to unionize, the only question presented to the Court
was whether a state might properly prohibit picketing in the absence of a direct
employer-employee dispute. In the Swing case the Court applied the same
general doctrine as it had applied in the Thornhill case. But the doctrine was
applied against a state court injunction based on the common law of the state
forbidding resort to peaceful persuasion through picketing where no immediate
employer-employee relation existed; that is, where there was stranger picketing. In other words, the Supreme Court in the Swing case did the unusual in
requiring the states in these cases to recast and revise their common-law rules
on the subject of the regulation of picketing, where the fact that strangers did
the picketing was crucial. The Court did not consider the legality of the
pickets' objectives, and made no mention of a state policy against picketing
for the purpose of forcing employees to unionize, while the decision in the
instant case was based on the existence of such a policy in Wisconsin.
The dissent did not appear to take cognizance of the fact that the picketing
here was in violation of a state statute. The dissent failed to declare the Wisconsin statute unconstitutional, but it supported the right of employees to
picket for organizational purposes, a right which if exercised would violate the
state statute. Such a rule would put union policy above state policy. The right
of a state to forbid an employer to coerce his employees in the matter of union
participation seems to be implicit in all state and federal labor relations laws.
If the dissenters believe in free choice of bargaining agents by employees in
a unit, they should not disapprove of the Wisconsin statute which prohibited
picketing where it was aimed at forcing an employer to coerce his employees
in such matters.
The dissent accused the Court of having signed a "formal surrender" and
charged that as a result of the decision in the instant case "state courts and
state legislatures are free to decide whether to permit or suppress any particular
picket line for any reason other than a blanket policy against all picketing."' 5
The majority confirmed, once more, the right of a state to enjoin even peace14. 354 U.S. at 295-96.
15. Id. at 297.
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ful picketing for organizational purposes, where this type of picketing violates
a state policy forbidding harm to innocent employers and interference with the
right of employees to make their own free choice of a union representative.
In future cases unions will continue to ask the courts whether a state, by
virtue of its police power, has the right to regulate picketing which it expressly
or impliedly condemns as violative of its laws, and whether the method of
regulation that the state chooses complies with the requirements of due process
of law. 16 In Nebbia v. New York,' 7 it was held that due process requires ...
only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that
the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought
to be attained. ' ' sS It will remain in the hands of the courts to decide whether
a given state regulatory statute is "arbitrary" or "capricious."

Monopolies - Vertical Stock Acquisitions as Violative of the Clayton Act.

-Between 1917 and 1919, E. I. du Pont de Nemours Corporation acquired a
total of 23 per cent of the outstanding stock of General Motors Corporation.
Du Pont was and continued to be (to an ever greater degree) the primary supplier of automotive finishes and fabrics to General Motors. The United States
brought an action against du Pont in 1949, charging that the stock acquisition tended to create a monopoly of certain lines of commerce. The district
court dismissed the action. On direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, held, two Justices dissenting and three Justices taking no part in the
consideration of the case, reversed and remanded to the district court. Section
7 of the Clayton Act, before as well as after its amendment, applied to vertical
as well as horizontal acquisitions of stock and its provisions are violated whenever the probability exists that the continued holding of such stock will result
in the creation of a monopoly of any line of commerce. Unitcd States v. E. L
du Pont de Nemours and Co., 353 U.S. 536 (1957).
This was the first attack by the United States upon a vertical stock acquisition,' and the first to be brought so many years after the acquisition in ques16. Since a state's police power has been broadly defined to include the right to "..
regulate its internal commerce, and to provide for the health and government of its
citizens . . ! ' the decisions will more likely depend on the due process tect. Thurlow v.
Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 523 (1347).

17.

291 U.S. 502 (1934).

lS.

Id. at 525.

1.

H.R. Rep. No. 1191, S1st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).

Mlergers and acquisitions have

traditionally been designated as horizontal, vertical or conglomerate. Horizontal acquisitions are those in which the firms involved are engaged in roughly similar lines of
endeavor; vertical acquisitions are those in which the purchase repreents a movement
either backward from or forward toward the ultimate consumer; and conglomerate acquisi-

tions are those in which there is no discernible relationship in the nature of business between the acquiring and the acquired firms.
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tion. Section 7 of the Clayton Act,2 before it was amended, provided that "...
no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired
and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in
any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of
commerce."3
The majority found that the first paragraph of section 7, ". . .written in
the disjunctive, plainly is framed to reach not only the corporate acquisition of
stock of a competing corporation . . .but also the corporate acquisition of
stock of any corporation . . . where the effect may be [to] . . tend to create
a monopoly of any line of commerce,"'4 and concluded that vertical acquisitions
which "tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce" were clearly within
the meaning of the final clause of the statute.
The only case directly in point, cited by the majority, was Ronald Fabrics
Co. v. Verney Brunswick Mills Inc.,5 in which a rayon converter alleged that
a competing corporation had restrained commerce by acquiring control of a
source of supply of rayon. The district court held that the allegation stated a
cause of action under section 7 of the Clayton Act. The other cases cited by
the majority pertained to horizontal acquisitions.
The dissent argued that the language of section 7 was ambiguous and adopted
the interpretation of the House Committee on the Judiciary, where Representative Clayton stated emphatically that the provisions relating to stock acquisitions by corporations were intended to eliminate the evils of the holding companies." The dissent also noted the policy of the Federal Trade Commission,
which since 1927 applied section 7 only to horizontal acquisitions involving a
substantial lessening of competition; 7 and cited InternationalShoe Co. v. FTC8
and FTC v. Thatcher Mfg. Co.9 Both cases held that the mere acquisition by
one corporation of the stock of a competitor, was not forbidden unless there
was a probability of a substantiallessening of competition.
Reliance on the International Shoe Co. and the Thatcher Mfg. Co. cases
2.

In 1914 Congress passed the Clayton Act for the purpose of arresting trusts and

monopolies in their incipiency, evils which the Sherman Act had failed to remedy. S. Rep.
No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914).
3. 38 Stat. 731. (Emphasis added.) This section was amended in 1950, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 18 (1950), but by its terms is not applicable in this case. The plaintiff also brought an
action for a violation of §§ 1, 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2 but this was
dismissed by the district court and was not determined by the Supreme Court.
4.

353 U.S. at 590-91.

S. CCH Trade Cases (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
57,514 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1914).
6. H.R. Rep. No. 627

The one evil referred to

in the report was the holding company which " . . is a means of holding under one control the competing companies whose stock it has just acquired."
7. 16 FTC Ann. Rep. 6 (1929); 13 FTC Ann. Rep. 13 (1927).
8. 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930).
9.

272 U.S. 554, 560 (1926).
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would seem misplaced. Both were actions brought under section 7 alleging
that certain horizontal acquisitions tended to result in a substantial lessening
of competition. The court in the Internation l Shoe Co. case, citing Staidard
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 10 held that section 3 of the Clayton
Act:" applied where there was a substantial lessening of competition, thus
limiting the application of that particular clause of section 3. That this holding
was not intended to limit the separate provisions of section 7 is apparent after
reading the Standard Fashion Co. case, which held that section 3 applied to
such agreements as would probably lessen competition to a substantial degree
or would create an actual tendency to monopoly.
The language of the statute would seem to support the majority view. In the
face of an inconclusive case history and a vague legislative record, section 7,
as remedial legislation, should be interpreted liberally.' 2 Since the over-all
purpose of the Clayton Act is the arresting of monopolies in their incipiency,
should not vertical acquisitions come within the scope of section 7?
The second issue turned on the time of this statute's application, that is,
is it limited to a violation arising at the time of the stock acquisition? The
majority found that ". . . du Pont purposely employed its stock to pry open
the General Motors market to entrench itself as the primary supplier... , s
and held that such use constituted a violation, even though the violation did not
14
arise at the time of the acquisition. Since there was no case history in point,
and since the congressional records and committee reports were silent,'0 the
majority based its decision on the general intent of Congress that the Clayton
Act supplement the Sherman Act so as to arrest monopolies in their incipiency.'
The dissent argued that the acquisition itself must be illegal and that the
subsequent use is irrelevant except as evidence of the illegality of the acquisition. It was explained that since the second paragraph of section 7 expressly
prohibited both illegal acquisition and illegal use, whereas the first paragraph
of section 7 (under which this action was commenced) prohibited only illegal
acquisition, Congress therefore intended to exclude illegal use.
If the view of the dissent were to be accepted, the statute's effectiveness
would be partially frustrated, for although vertical acquisitions, illegal when
made, would come within the scope of section 7, nothing could be done about
vertical stock acquisitions, valid when made but later employed in such a way
as to tend toward the creation of a monopoly in some line of commerce. The
arguments on either side are not conclusive, but it is submitted the holding of
10. 25S U.S. 346, 357 (1922).
11. 15 U.S.CA. § 13 (1914). This section generally prohibits discrimination in price,
service or facilities where the effect may be a substantial lezsening of competition or a
tendency to create a monopoly.
12. 59 CJ., Statutes §§ 563-576 (1932).
13. 353 U.S. at 606.

14. Prior cases under § 7 were brought at or near the time of acquisition.
U.S. at 598.

Se 353

15. 51 Cong. Rec. 1 (1914); H.R. Rep. N'o. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sus. 1 (1914); S. Rep.
No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
16. S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914).
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the majority more effectively accomplishes the purpose of the Clayton Act.
Left unsettled is the course du Pont will have to follow to comply with the
decision, since the majority did not specify what type of relief was necessary,
but ordered the district
court to determine what was equitable and appropriate
17
in the public interest.
One remedy already suggested is the establishment of a non-voting trust,
whereby du Pont would give up its right to vote and reduce its representation
on the General Motors board of directors. The Government has taken the position that this is not enough, and has indicated that it will demand outright sale
of part of the stock, and distribution of the rest to du Pont stockholders.18 It is
apparent that a forced sale would impose a heavy capital gains tax upon du
Pont. Should that be taken into account by the district court? The fact that
there is a heavy tax serves only to prove that du Pont has profited substantially
from a stock acquisition and use which has now been found to be unlawful.
The injury would not, however, be limited to du Pont. It is certain that the
sale of so large a block of stock, within a short period of time, would have a
disquieting effect on the market and, in all probability, would tend to drive the
price of the stock downward. Thus innocent stockholders of General Motors
would also be penalized. If the trustee plan, suggested by du Pont, is rejected,
might not the court now determine what percentage of stock may still be retained by du Pont (since the Government's objection is not to du Pont's stock
ownership per se but to its substantial stock ownership) and then direct that
the remainder be sold over a period of years on the open market, or distributed
to du Pont stockholders?

Patents - Secrecy Order as a Bar to Maintenance of Suit.-An order of
secrecy was placed upon plaintiff's application for a patent dealing with a means
whereby an object may escape radar detection. He was subsequently notified
that his claims were allowed but that no patent could be issued during pendency
of the order. Plaintiff applied for compensation to the administrative agency
which issued the order and, receiving none, sued the United States to recover
for the damages caused by the filing of the order in the patent application and
for compensation for the Government's use of the patent. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, held, dismissed without
prejudice. The Invention Secrecy Act does not permit the maintenance of suit
in the district court by a patent applicant during the pendency of the secrecy
order. Halpern v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
The Invention Secrecy Act 1 empowers the secretary of a defense department
and certain other officials to issue an order of secrecy with respect to an invention for which a patent application has been filed, whenever issuance of
17. 353 U.S. at 607-08.
18. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1957, p. 14, col. 4. Bedingfield, Trust Decision May Alter
Business Alliance Pattern, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1957, p. 1, col. 6.
1. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-88 (1954).
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the patent would jeopardize the national security. During pendency of the
secrecy order, no patent may be issued,2 and disclosure by the inventor to unauthorized sources may work a forfeiture of his right to a patent,3 and subject
him to criminal penalties as well 4
In order to assure that a patent applicant so constrained will not be denied
just compensation by reason of his inability to exploit the fruits of his labor,
the Act offers him a choice of two methods of securing relief. The claimant
may wait until the patent is issued and then bring suit in the Court of Claims.&0
Since the patent can be issued only after revocation of the secrecy order, the
action obviously cannot be put before the court until the secrecy order is
rescinded. 6 The alternative procedure permits a claimant,7 upon receiving
notice that, except for the secrecy order, his patent application is otherwise in
condition for allowance, to apply to the department head who caused the
secrecy order to be issued, for compensation for the damages resulting from
the order and for the use of the invention by the United States. If full settlement of the claim cannot be effected, the department head may pay up to 75
per cent of the amount which is considered to be just compensation and the
claimant may then bring suit in the Court of Claims or in a district court "...
for an amount which when added to the award shall constitute just compensation .... ,,s This method presupposes that suit will be brought prior to issuance
of the patent, but is silent as to whether it may be brought while the secrecy
order is still in effect. It was manifestly Congress' intent to give claimants a
measure of relief without waiting for the issuance of the patent. The presumption that claimants could proceed before revocation of the secrecy order,
while not expressly stated in the Act, may easily be inferred. This the present
court acknowledged. The court also acknowledged that the claimant complied
with the terms of the statute, but insisted that judicial determination of such
claims was impossible during pendency of the secrecy order, since a trial, requiring an investigation into the nature and merits of the invention concerned,
as well as its relationship to other devices of a possibly secret nature, would
jeopardize the national security.
The claim of privilege has ample precedent. The United States Supreme
Court has on several occasions recognized the Government's right to prevent
disclosure of military secrets in judicial proceedings, O a view also propounded
2.

35 U.S.C.A. § iS1 (1954).

3. 35 U.S.C.A. § 182 (1954).
4. 35 U.S.CA. § 186 (1954).
5. 35 U.S.C.A. § 183 (1954).
6. The remedy that this procedure affords the claimant is substantially the -ame as
was available to claimants under the law formerly in effect.
40 Stat. 394 (1917), as
amended, 54 Stat. 710 (1940).
7. 35 U.S.C.A. § 183 (1954).
S. 35 U.S.C.A. § 183 (1954).
9. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105

(1875).
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by the English courts,' and noted text writers." In certain circumstances, the
public interest may justify even the permanent exclusion from judicial consideration of an action involving state secrets, despite the inability of the aggrieved party to receive redress in any other manner. In a post-Civil War case
involving a suit for compensation based on a contract with the United States
for the performance of espionage activities, it was stated that ". . . as a
general principle . . . public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a
court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to a disclosure of
matters which the law itself regards as confidential,
and respecting which it
2
will not allow the confidence to be violated."'
The plaintiff in the instant case, conceding that a public trial of the action
would be out of the question, argued that in camera proceedings would be an
appropriate method of assuring that defense secrets involved would not be compromised by a trial prior to revocation of the secrecy order. Since such proceedings are comparatively unknown to the American judicial system and would be
a most unusual procedure, the court reasoned that their authorization must
come from the legislature rather than the judiciary. The fear intimated by
the court, that such proceedings might entail a danger to the national security
because of the necessity of involving clerks and reporters in the trial, would
seem exaggerated since it is reasonable to expect that the Government could
make available the small number of clerical personnel with top security clearance to staff such proceedings.
It is obvious that there exists here a conflict between the plaintiff's individual property rights, and the welfare and safety of the nation as a whole.
In any such conflict, at least with respect to civil actions, 13 the individual rights
must be subordinated to the common good. 14 It is, however, in the national
interest to promote research and to reward inventiveness in fields which relate
to our defense or national safety. The result in the present case is, therefore,
unsatisfactory. If in camera proceedings, with adequate safeguards to maintain
secrecy, require legislative action, such should be forthcoming, certainly, at
least, in cases where the applicant consents to the secret procedure.
10. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., (1942) A.C. 624.
11. Professor Wigmore, a noted critic of the extension of such privilege beyond the
bounds of absolute necessity, has written: "There must be a privilege for secrets of State,
i.e. matters whose disclosure would endanger [sic] the Nation's governmental requirements
or its relations of friendship and profit with other nations." 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2212 (a)
(3d ed. 1940). See also 1 Greenleaf, Evidence §§ 250-51 (16th ed. 1899).
12. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875).
13. As to a claim of secrecy in criminal cases see Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657

(1957).
14. See United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887); Respublica v. Sparhawk,
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357 (Pa. 1788); Russell v. City of New York, 2 Denio 461 (N.Y. 1845).
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Restaurant's Implied Warranty to Guest of Customer.--Plaintiff

guest brought an action against defendant restauranteur for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption. Plaintiff and a friend had
lunch, paid for by the friend, at the defendant's restaurant. Plaintiff was injured
when she bit into a piece of glass imbedded in a roll. Defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint, held, denied. Where a host and a guest order food in a
restaurant and their orders are accepted, an implied contract of sale arises on
the part of both to pay for the food received, and an implied warranty arises
on the part of the restaurant to provide them both with food fit for human
consumption. Conklin v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corp., 5 Mlisc. 2d 496, 161
N.Y.S.2d 205 (N.Y. City Ct., 1957).
Generally, at common law, no warranty attached to the sale of goods unless
the seller expressly warranted them to be fit for a particular purpose.' An exception to this rule developed in the sale of food for immediate consumption;
it was impliedly warranted that such provisions were wholesome. - At first, the
remedy for breach of this implied warranty was an action on the case*3 similar
to an action for deceit, but without the necessity of alleging scienter or intent
to deceive 4 This tort action was limited almost entirely to direct transactions
between buyer and seller, and was treated as inseparable from some contractual
relationship.5 Torts and contracts were not clearly distinguishable at this point.
Not until 1778 did a court first recognize the right of a person to recover for
breach of an implied warranty by proceeding in contract. Following this,
nearly all such actions were brought in contract to avoid the greater burden
of proof required in tort cases. 7 However, as a condition to recovery, the
courts insisted on the basic elements of a contract, one of which was privity 8
The common-law rule was codified with the passage of section 15 of the
Uniform Sales Act, which provides for an implied warranty of merchantability
where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that
description. 9 Extending liability under this act to the operator of a restaurant
1. Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73, 86 (1S51).
2. 1 Williston, Sales § 241 (rev. ed. 1943).
3. Smith and Prosser, Torts 891 (1952).
4. Comment, 29 B.U.L. Rev. 107 (1949).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 13, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 177S).
7. Comment, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 425, 427 (1955). To recover in tort, the plaintiff
usually had to prove the res ipsa loquitur doctrine which is very difficult where no one
person had control of the article from its preparation through its sale.
S. Race v. Krum, 222 N.Y. 410, 11S N.E. 853 (1918).
9. This section has been adopted by thirty-four states, including New York. It states
.there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitncs for any
particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, . . . makes known to the seller the particular purpoze for which
the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller'.s sil or judgment ....
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that
description (whether he be the grower or the manufacturer or not), there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality." Uniform Sales Act § 1S(1), (2).
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presents a unique problem because some jurisdictions, in keeping with the

common-law rule, maintain that the serving of food on the premises is not a
sale but a service and therefore not within the terms of the Uniform Sales
Act.10 Now, however, many jurisdictions hold that the transaction is sufficiently analogous to a sale to justify liability under the Sales Act.'
There is a split of authority as to whether or not privity of contract is a

necessary element in an action for breach of an implied warranty. The majority
view is that since a warranty action is based on the law of contracts, there can

be no implied warranty in the absence of privity of contract.' 2 According to a
leading New York case, the manufacturer or seller of personal property is not
liable for breach of an implied warranty to third party strangers who have no

contractual relations with him, whether they are subpurchasers or donees. 18
However, an ultimate consumer may be able to recover from4 the manufacturer

in negligence even though there be no privity between them.'
The minority view denies the necessity of privity, and virtually makes the
seller an insurer of his product. Courts adhering to this view have given a

variety of reasons to justify their position. For example, some argue that the
implied warranty runs with the chattel. This would make ownership or indicia
of title the basis for recovery, and it would give a cause of action for breach of
an implied warranty to anyone who rightfully comes into possession of the
goods. 15 Other courts feel that since an implied warranty is imposed on the

seller by operation of law and independent of any assent on his part, there is
no true contractual relationship involved, and therefore privity is unnecessary.

They conclude that the dictates of public policy demand that the manufacturer
be made absolutely liable to an ultimate consumer who cannot adequately
protect himself.'
10. Albrecht v. Rubinstein, 135 Conn. 243, 63 A.2d 158 (1948); Merrill v. Hodson, 88
Conn. 314, 91 AtI. 533 (1914); Nisky v. Childs Co., 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 Atl. 805 (1927);
Rickner v. Ritz Restaurant Co., 13 N.J. Misc. 818, 181 Atl. 398 (Sup. Ct. 1935). This
view is known as the Connecticut-New Jersey rule. See Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 1027, 1029
(1949).
11. Hanback v. Dutch Baker Boy, Inc., 107 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Friend v. Childs
Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918); Zorinsky v. American Legion, 163
Neb. 212, 79 N.W.2d 172 (1956); Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924).
That the majority of jurisdictions follow this Massachusetts-New York rule, see Annot.,
7 A.L.R.2d 1027, 1032 (1949).
12. Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955); Gearing v. Berkson, 223
Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916); Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., 276 N.Y. 172, 11 N.E.2d
718 (1937); Pennsylvania Exchange Bank v. Lasko, 4 Misc. 2d 1039, 159 N.Y.S.2d 429
(Sup. Ct. 1957); Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927).
13. Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 472, 139 N.E. 576, 577 (1923).
14. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852); Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 132
Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80 (1914), extended the dangerous instrumentality rule to include un.
-wholesome food. The defendant is held liable on the ground that he could reasonably have
foreseen that the plaintiff would be injured if the food was not wholesome.
15. Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927). Contra,
,Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
16. Jacob Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
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The instant case held that an implied in fact contract arose as soon as the
restaurant accepted the orders, and that each person made a separate contract
with the restaurant even though one party paid the check. 11 Assuming there
had been a prior agreement between the host and the guest to the effect that
the host would pay the check, it would not have been held controlling because,
in the absence of notice, the restaurant would naturally have assumed that
both parties were contracting individually. If the host refused to pay for the
guest's meal, the guest would be liable in law for the price of the food she
impliedly contracted to pay for. It followed, therefore, that the restaurant
was under an implied contractual obligation to provide the plaintiff guest with
food fit for human consumption.
The instant case is clearly distinguishable from cases in which a buyer
purchases food from a store, and others consume it off the premises. In such
transactions, the contract arises when the food is delivered to the purchaser.
Only the buyer, therefore, is in privity with the seller, and an ultimate consumer
would be denied recovery for breach of warranty.18
Even if the host ordered for the guest, the court pointed out, there would still
be privity between the guest and the restaurant, because for the sake of convenience, one person will very often order for a group. In so doing, that
person is acting in the capacity of an agent for the others solely for the purpose of ordering. 19
The court in the principal case was correct in finding privity by reason
of an implied in fact contract, since New York has long adhered to the objective theory of contract, making the outward manifestation or e.xpression of
assent controlling.20 The restaurant was reasonably led to believe that the
guest, in ordering the meal, intended to pay for it. Conversely, the restaurant
impliedly obligated itself to serve the plaintiff food fit for human consumption
when it accepted the order. Therefore, there was mutuality of obligation and
a binding implied in fact contract.
Payment of the food is not a material element in determining the obligations
of the parties because the sale had already been made by the restaurant to the
two patrons, and the payment was merely the settlement of an obligation or
debt incurred by both. In a similar situation, a California court stated:
"Having taken an order from respondent and pursuant thereto having served
the food, it does not lie in the mouth of appellant to deny privity between him17. Accord, Jensen v. Berris, 31 Cal. App. 2d 537, SS P.2d 220 (1939).
18. Prinsen v. Russos, 194 WIs. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927).

19. This situation differs from cases in which one person purchases food at a store, and
a subsequent consumer off the premises seeks to recover on the ground that the purchaser

is his agent, and that he is the real principal in the transaction. In most of the cases,
the proposed agency was repudiated and recovery was denied for lack of evidence of
any agency in fact between purchaser and consumer. Redmond v. Borden's Farm Products
Co., 245 N.Y. 512, 157 N.E. 3S (1927); Dickinson v. Sperling, 153 Misc. 505, 286 N.Y.
Supp. 934 (City Ct. 1936). In Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 385,

175 N.E. 105 (1931), it was held that a wife is the agent in law of her husband for the
purchase of necessaries.
20. Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 Fed. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
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self and the respondent because she did not individually and personally offer
him the purchase price in payment of the meal."12 1 "Which person pays the
check ... is only a matter of private arrangement between the customers themselves ... [and] of no concern to the restaurateur as long as he is paid.1 22
The court also stated, without elaboration, that the third party beneficiary
theory 23 could be applied in the present case. Although this doctrine was
originally limited to creditor beneficiaries, 24 the right of a donee beneficiary to
sue has been upheld in cases where a close family relationship existed between
the promisee and the beneficiary. 25 The trend has been toward an expansion
of the donee beneficiary cause of action.2 6 The decision in the principal case
27
continues the trend and gives it a further extension.
For a beneficiary to recover, he must show that the contracting parties
intended to bestow the benefit of all or part of the performance directly upon
him. 28 Assuming that, in the present case, the host contracted both for himself and the guest, the latter was quite obviously an intended beneficiary, and
the defendant's pbrformance ran directly to her. Since the right of a donee
beneficiary vests as soon as the contract is made, 29 the obligation of the
restaurant to the guest originates at the time the order is accepted.
Giminez v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co.30 pronounced the rule, substantially
followed today, that the third party beneficiary doctrine is not available to a
non-contracting consumer. But Giminez was a retail sales case, and in such a
case the contracting parties do not intend to benefit some remote consumer, and
the seller's performance does not run directly to him. Here, however, the plaintiff beneficiary was present, ordered the food of her own choice, and the de21.
22.

Jensen v. Berris, 31 Cal. App. 2d 537, 541, 88 P.2d 220, 221 (1939).
Conklin v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corp., 5 Misc. 2d 496, 498, 161 N.Y.S.2d 205,

207 (City Ct. 1957).
23.

Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).

It seems that the doctrine of Lawrence v.

Fox intended the rule to be that any third party for whose direct benefit a contract was
made could sue on that contract.
24. Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280 (1877).
25.

DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917).

26.

Filardo v. Foley Bros. Inc., 297 N.Y. 217, 78 N.E.2d 480 (1948), rev'd on other

grounds, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); Comment, 19 Fordham L. Rev. 89, 97 (1950).

It now

seems that any third party will be given a right of action on a contract made for his
benefit where there is any recognized relationship between promisee and beneficiary which
gives rise to an obligation on the part of the promisee to look out for the best interests
of the beneficiary.
27. Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918), extended the list of donee
beneficiaries entitled to sue on the theory of a moral obligation owing from the promisee
to the beneficiary at least far enough to include nieces and nephews. Prior to that, the
category was limited to one's wife, child or affianced wife. In this case, there was no
family relationship at allbetween host and guest.
28. H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co, 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
29. The right of a creditor beneficiary does not vest until he changes his position in
reliance on the contract. Restatement, Contracts § 143 (1932).
30. 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934). See also Sazano v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 268
App. Div. 993, 51 N.Y.S.2d 645 (2d Dep't 1944).
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fendant accepted the order. The restaurant's obligation to perform ran directly
to the plaintiff. Since the defendant undertook to serve the plaintiff, its performance should carry with it an implied warranty in her favor. If that is so,
the Giminez case should be limited to its facts, and the courts should recognize
an implied warranty for the benefit of intended beneficiaries. 3 '
Whether the case at bar be considered under the implied in fact contract
theory or the third part beneficiary theory, it is clearly not an attack upon the
privity rule, but an affirmation of it.

Witnesses

-

Right of Defense To Examine Government Witnesses' Reports.

-Petitioner was convicted of filing a false non-communist affidavit with the
NLRB. Testimony of two government witnesses supplied the principal evidence
relating to the period immediately surrounding the filing of the affidavit. Each
had made oral or written reports to the FBI relating to the respective events
about which he testified. Petitioner moved for an order requiring the Government to produce the reports for the purpose of impeaching the witnesses. The
trial court denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held,
one Justice dissenting, reversed. A defendant is entitled to inspect all reports
of government witnesses touching upon events and activities as to which they
testified upon trial. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
Although the defense in a criminal case is not generally given the right to
inspect documents in the hands of the prosecution in advance of the trial,1
a distinction must be made between the right to pre-trial discovery and that of
inspection at the trial itself.2 The accused is entitled to all the evidence in the
case legitimately bearing upon the question of the veracity of a witness of the
opposite party.3 The defendant has the right, upon proper request or demand,
to inspect and use, for purposes of cross-examination, any paper or memorandum which is used by a witness in court on direct examination for the purpose of refreshing his present recollection. 4
31. Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 NE2d 421 (1953).

In

this case, a mother brought an inflammable cowboy suit from the defendant's store. While
her son was wearing it, it became ignited causing the boy's death. The court refused to

grant the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's cause of action for breach of an
implied warranty of fitness, which might be some indication that it would recognize an
implied warranty as running to a third party beneficiary.
1. Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d S3 (3th Cir. 1949); United States v. Rosenfeld,
57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1932); People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Ct., 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84
(1927). For a comparison of pretrial discovery, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 16; Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
2. United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 73 (2d Cir. 1944). "It is one thing to
say that an accused shall in advance of trial have inspection of statements of witnesses
taken by the prosecution in preparation of its case; it is another to deny him the benefit
of so much of such statements as is shown to be inconsistent with the Vitneszc' testi-

mony on the stand and would impeach them."
3. 3 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 903 (12th ed. 1955).
4. Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1927); Taylor v. United States, 19
F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1927); Morris v. United States, 149 Fed. 123 (5th Cir. 1905).
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Prior to the instant case, the general rule where the documents were not
used in court was set forth in Goldman v. United States,5 where the Supreme
Court said: "We think it the better rule that where a witness does not use
his notes or memoranda in court, a .party has no absolute right to have them
produced and to inspect them. Where as here, they are not only the witness'
notes but are also part of the Government's files, a large discretion must be
allowed the trial judge." 6
In addition to having access to documents actually used in court, the defense
has been given the right to demand production of statements or documents
taken from witnesses prior to the trial which have been shown to contradict
their testimony. 7 In Gordon v. United States8 the Supreme Court apparently
defined the foundation which must be laid by the defense in a demand for
production. Lower courts have interpreted this decision as requiring a showing
of contradiction between the documents and the testimony.0 In the Gordon
case the Court required that the demand be for specific documents and not
"... propose any broad or blind fishing expeditions among documents possessed by the Government on the chance that something impeaching might
turn up."' 0 The practice frequently followed, especially in the Second Circuit,
was for the documents to be produced to the trial judge for his determination
of relevancy and materiality."
The Government has the privilege of refusing to disclose official information on the grounds that it would affect adequate law enforcement abd national
security. 12 This privilege of non-disclosure has been recognized by the Supreme
Court.1 3 However, when the Government brings a criminal action in which
evidence otherwise privileged becomes relevant, it must choose between
full
4
disclosure of relevant documents and inability to obtain conviction.1
5.
6.

316 U.S. 129 (1942).
Id. at 132; accord, United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1956);

D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951); Kaufman v. United States, 163
F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1947).
7. United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); People v. Davis, 52 Mich.
569, 18 N.W. 362 (1884); People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422 (1933).
8. 344 U.S. 414 (1952). "By proper cross-examination, defense counsel laid a founda-

tion for his demand by showing that the documents were in existence, were in possession
of the Government, were made by the Government's witness under examination, were
contradictory of his present testimony, and that the contradiction was as to relevant,
important and material matters which directly bore on the main issues being tried. .. .
Id. at 418.
9. United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1956); Jencks v. United States,

226 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953).
10. 344 U.S. at 419.
11. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v. Beckman,
155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944).
12. 3 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 793 (12th ed. 1955).
13. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), held that Department
of Justice Order No. 3229 which conferred upon department subordinates the privilege of
refusing to produce official records in response to a subpoena duces tecum was valid. For
a discussion of governmental immunity, see Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 881 (1951).
14. United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
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In the instant case, the majority set forth the necessary essentials for a
foundation of an accused's right to production for inspection. The demand must
be for the production of specific documents and the statements must be those
of a person offered as a witness. The majority quoted the requirement outlined in Gordon v. United States: "For production purposes, it need only
appear that the evidence is relevant, competent, and outside of any exclusionary
rule. . ."'5 The Court held that the court of appeals misinterpreted the
Gordon case when it required a showing of inconsistency between the reports
and the testimony,' and that in the Gordon case such inconsistency was not
a prerequisite to an accused's right to a production of the documents for inspection. While it may be difficult to accept the Court's interpretation of the
Gordon case,' 7 the new rule appears to be in line with the objective of making
available to the accused all evidence relevant and material to his defense. If
the defense were not given the right of inspection, the presence of conflict
between the reports and the testimony would not be made known to the defense unless the witness admitted conflict.
Without expressly saying so, the Court in effect overruled Goldman v. United
States, which held that in a situation where the witness does not use his notes
or memoranda in court "a large discretion must be allowed the trial judge."' s
The discretion of the trial judge to deny inspection is now removed by the
present holding "...
that the petitioner was entitled to an order directing
the Government to produce for inspection all reports . . touching the events
and activities.. ." as to which the witnesses testified at the trial.' 0
The majority held further that because only the defense is adequately
equipped to determine the effective use of the documents to impeach the
veracity of the witness, the defense is entitled to inspect the reports initially.
The Court put the duty on the prosecution to select relevant passages from
reports in its possession and turn them over to the defense. The prior governmental practice of submitting all past statements of its witnesses to the trial
judge who would select only those relevant to the case at hand and give them
to the defense was disapproved. 0
Finally, recognizing the governmental privilege of non-disclosure, the Court,
reasoning that where the Government chooses to prosecute a person for a
crime it is not free to deny him the right to meet the case made against him,
held that when the Government elects not to comply with an order to produce
15. 344 U.S. at 420.
16. Jencks v. United States, 226 F.2d 540, 552 (5th Cir. 1955).
17. That the Supreme Court in the Gordon case regarded the showing of inconsistency
as something more than one fact present in that case, see 344 U.S. at 419 n.10, where in
distinguishing Goldman v. United States, the Court stated that in that case "the notes
sought to be inspected had neither been used in court, nor was there any proof that they
would show prior inconsistent statements."
18. 316 U.S. at 132.

19. 353 U.S. at 663.
20. See note 11 supra.
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for inspection relevant statements of government witnesses touching the
subject matter of their testimony, the action must be dismissed.
Two Justices concurred in the result, but did not approve of the removal
of discretion from the trial judge to refuse inspection and regarding the disapproval of the practice of submission of the documents to the trial judge
for his decision on relevancy and materiality prior to submission to the defense.
The argument in favor of retaining the power of discretion by the trial judge
has merit. In matters relating to the production of evidence or the scope
of cross-examination the trial judge should be allowed a reasonable discretion. 21
The individual's right to prepare his defense must be balanced against the
public interest in safeguarding information in the interest of national security.
The proper determination of a motion to produce reports made by a witness
should depend upon the particular circumstances of each case.
The problem of permitting the accused to receive all information necessary
to his defense and at the same time protecting the public interest in safeguarding executive files is also better solved by the method outlined in the concurring
opinion. All of the documents concerned would be turned over to the trial
judge; the court could then determine by inspection whether the documents
produced were irrelevant or privileged. In this manner the prosecution would
not be placed in the position of determining what was relevant. When this
discretion is vested in the trial judge the individual is not denied material
essential to his defense and public interests are not sacrificed.
The dissent by Justice Clark pointed out the conflict between the rule of
the instant case and that of Goldman v. United States. The major portion
of the dissent was devoted to emphasizing the necessity for the inviolacy of
investigative reports. However, the dissent's statement that ". . .the Court
has opened their files to the criminal and thus afforded him a Roman holiday
for rummaging through confidential information as well as vital national
secrets" 22 ignores the majority's rule that the demand be for production of
specific documents. To complain that the raw material of the FBI files would
have to be disclosed under this rule was to ignore the Court's requirement that
the documents constitute evidence which is relevant, competent and outside
of any exclusionary rule. Certainly it is possible to strike a balance between
the right of an accused to all documents which are relevant to an effort to
discredit the government witnesses and the need to safeguard the legitimate
public interest.
It is submitted that the instant case took a large step forward in removing
the necessity for a showing of contradiction between the documents sought and
the testimony of the witness. However, despite the fact that we have here a
situation which arose at the trial and that its application would seem confined
to a demand made at the trial, the question of when the statements must be
produced for inspection received conflicting answers in the courts below. In
21.

Glasser v. United States,

315 U.S. 60 (1942); Alford

v. United States, 282 U.S.

687 (1931).
22. 353 U.S. at 681-82.
23. Three district courts refused pre-trial discovery of statements to the FBI, arguing
that the instant case applied only to a situation arising at the trial: United States v.
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addition, the Court did not foresee the problem which would arise when a demand would be made for statements which the Government determined were
relevant only in part.
To forestall further liberalization of the present ruling and to solve the
problem of the procedure to be followed when the Government claims that the
statement ordered to be produced contains matter not relevant to the subject
matter of the testimony, Congress enacted Public Law Number 269.-4 The
statute follows the present decision by forbidding inspection until the witness
has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case. It also requires that
where the United States claims that a statement contains material not relevant
to the testimony, the statement in question be delivered to the trial judge
for inspection. The judge would excise unrelated matter before turning the
statements over to the defense. Whereas the Supreme Court required dismisal
of the indictment when the Government refused to produce a relevant report,
the statute gives the trial judge discretion either to strike from the record
the witness' testimony or to declare a mistrial.
Benson, - F. Supp. - (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Anderson, - F. Supp. - (D ..
1957); United States v. Grossman,

-

F. Supp. -

(D.N.J. 1957). But in another district

court case, an order for production of relevant documents was dirccted in advance of the
trial: United States v. Hall, -

24. IS U.S.C.A. § 3500 (1957).

F. Supp.

-

(W). Ky. 1957).

